

2012-2014 SUPPORT PROGRAM (PACE II) GUINEA-BISSAU FINAL EVALUATION



Ana Barradas international consultant

Bissau

7 August- 4 September 2015

Assessment commissioned by UNDP in Guinea-Bissau

Preamble

The Electoral Support Program that gave birth to PACE II (Electoral Cycle Support Program 2012-2014) started February 2012 with closure date scheduled for December 2013 but extended two weeks after the second round of presidential elections, which took place May 18, 2014.

PACE II Support Program to the Electoral Cycle 2012-2014 has funded the pre-election phase and the first round of snap presidential elections of 18 March 2012. Although the conduct of snap presidential elections was recognized credible, democratic and transparent by the international community, the results were challenged by a group of candidates. The appeals to the Supreme Court were rejected. Blocking of the presidential election led to April 12, 2012 coup orchestrated by the military.

Following the coup, a transitional government was established with the support of ECOWAS which lasted a year and lead the country towards the organization of snap parliamentary and presidential elections. Given the deep divisions that existed within the national political class and among international partners on the recognition of the Transitional Government, only on the first quarter of 2013 a consensus was reached to form a more inclusive and consensual government to create the necessary conditions to hold general elections before the end of 2013.

To achieve these objectives, the Government requested in May 2013 United Nations support to finance and organize the general elections. Based on this request, a review of PACE II (2012-2014) was conducted in order to take stock of the support provided to the March 2012 operations and to review the project components. The revised PACE II aimed to support the electoral process management structures and electoral actors to improve the framework of democratic governance in Guinea-Bissau and to strengthen the institutional capacity of the institutions responsible for the management of these processes.

UNDP in Guinea-Bissau has designed the layout of an independent assessment team to evaluate the performance of the PACE II. This team - which should be composed of two members, namely Ana Barradas, international consultant, who would lead the team, and a national consultant¹ who was not contracted - was not constituted. The consultant only began her assessment 7 August 2015.

As part of her mandate, the consultant will present her preliminary findings and share a draft report indicating the scope of the assessment of key components for validation by UNDP and other stakeholders in the 27 days following the start of the mission. After presenting the report, the consultant will present her findings and receive feedback in a meeting with stakeholders Monday,

¹ According to the terms of reference: "Evaluation Team: The international and national consultants will conduct the evaluation, submit the methodological approach including an evaluation matrix and a work plan with the responsibility of each member of the team, collect and analyze information, draw up the draft report, the PowerPoint presentation and the final report in accordance with the terms of reference. "

August 31. Based on this session and the contribution of the players mentioned above, the consultant will submit a final report before leaving the country Sept. 4, 2015.

So the purpose of the evaluation is to assess the particular project to support elections, including their specific contributions, relevance, effectiveness, resource optimization, efficiency, impact and sustainability and also the issue of gender, as requested by the Terms of Reference.

The evaluation will address the contribution of UNDP in terms of results, as well as its short, medium term and long-term contributions to the achievement of results in the project framework.

The consultant would like to thank all those who made themselves available for discussion for their insight, helpfulness and kindness, including those who left the project to other assignments and could still find time to keep in touch, and UNDP staff and leadership for their support and guidance in the development of the work plan. The same goes for all other stakeholders who have done their best, with full openness and cooperation, to answer all the questions and problems that were posed by the consultant.

Contents

Title and preamble	Pages 1-4
Contents	5
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	6
Executive Summary	7
Introduction	9
Description of the intervention	11
Objectives and scope of the evaluation	24
Methodological Approach	28
Data Analysis	30
Results and Conclusions	46
Recommendations	57
Lessons learned	60
Annexes	62

List of acronyms and abbreviations

ANP	National Popular Assembly
CNE	National Elections Commission
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DEX	Direct execution
ECOWAS	Economic Community of the States of West Africa
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
EAD	Electoral Assistance Division
GTAPE	Support to Electoral Processes Technical Office
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
MAI	Ministry of Internal Administration
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MNECIC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PACE	Support Program to the Electoral Cycle
PAIGC	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
PAPP	Action Plan of the Country Programme
PPM	Plataforma Política das Mulheres
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
PRO-PALOP/TL	Programa de Apoio aos Ciclos Eleitorais dos Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa / Timor-Leste
PRS	Partido da Renovação Social (Social Renewal Party)
PUSD	Partido Unido Social Democrata (Social Democratic United Party)
REMPSECAO-GB	Rede de Mulheres para a Paz e Segurança da Comunidade Económica para o Desenvolvimento da África Ocidental
PMU	Project Management Unit
STJ	Supremo Tribunal of Justiça (Supreme Court)
UNDAF	United Nations Framework for Development Assistance
UNIOGBIS	UN Office for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services

Executive summary

The evaluation assesses the contribution of PACE II to the conduct of elections in line with local and international standards and the present legal framework, according to the contents of the overall objective. The evaluation examines the relevance of the project and the extension of the completion of the planned outputs, the contribution of these outputs to the actual project results, their impact and likely sustainability.

The assessment also examines the suitability of the form of assistance made available in order to specify lessons learned and make recommendations for the future development cooperation with the goal to support electoral management bodies in Guinea Bissau. To reach this goal, the evaluator reviews a number of factors, including the modality of financial support; management and governance mechanisms for the project; quality, relevance and effectiveness of the assistance and services, the design of the project, etc.

The consultant used a mixed method of analysis, based on qualitative and quantitative data, including a careful review of existing documents, the design of open interviews and structured questionnaires or surveys. Interviews were promoted with all stakeholders.

Several conclusions and key indicators emerge from this analysis:

PACE was able to handle almost all the obstacles and conflicts of interest within its jurisdiction and has achieved a high degree of service, persuasion, consensus and mutual respect.

Capacity building, impact and sustainability of all democratic exercises have improved if compared with the elections of previous years, as well as a sharper idea of what to further improve on this level.

A political component of monitoring and evaluation should be coupled to do project work plan to dynamically adapt outputs and outcomes that depend on changeable circumstances as the project gradually progresses.

Electoral events in Guinea-Bissau - especially the updating of the registration and local elections - are likely to need international support. Yet many lessons are learned which are sustainable. We must invest in these national players who already have considerable experience.

Beyond what has been done and can still progress, an innovative project for the installation of a permanent institution of learning and training could be considered that would in the long run at any time satisfy the identified needs to the strengthening of the less developed aspects as empowerment, ownership, aid effectiveness, sustainability - some of the fundamental principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.

Of these findings and indicators, recommendations arise for the short term, especially in the light of a road ahead from this point on:

A new electoral cycle was launched in January 2015. It is important to emphasize that UNDP, due to previous experience with PACE, developed in 2015 and implemented a project (at this present time only funded by UNDP's own resources and seeking to mobilize other resources) to strengthen the capacity of democratic institutions, CNE, CSOs and Parliament in a single pool. The main objective of this project is to strengthen the technical capacity and infrastructure of electoral bodies to ensure sustainability and reduced cost of elections; It also focuses on the ongoing civic education (mobilizing not just for voting and education on how to vote, but especially education on civic participation in democratic processes, awareness by the parliament of the communities / electoral circles and the promotion of citizen participation in democratic processes and political dialogue through CSOs.

For the immediate introduction of democracy training and support, the stakeholders will be better positioned for the arising issues.

The positive effect of the previous elections and the relationship between the stakeholders were still strong until a new institutional crisis set in with the resignation of the Government by the President of the Republic on 12 August 2015. In the process of political dialogue led by the ONIOGBIS, through the good offices of the Special Representative, a group of international partners is now in place and active, meeting regularly to evaluate and define the action plan necessary to respond to the current crisis.

Introduction

Revised PACE II had the goal to support the electoral process management structures and the electoral actors to improve the framework of democratic governance in Guinea-Bissau and strengthen the institutional capacity of the institutions responsible for the management of these processes. The specific objectives of the revised PACE II were:

1. Support the electoral processes management structures and stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau for the implementation of voter cards delivery operations (2nd tour) and election operations for snap presidential elections in March 2012;
2. Support for election operations (including voter registration) as part of the general elections conducted in 2014;
3. Civic education in a long term perspective of political participation (especially women and disadvantaged groups), peace building and articulation of reform of the security and defense sector in a framework of democratic governance;
4. Institutional strengthening and capacity building of the National Elections Commission (CNE), and other electoral stakeholders with a view to transfer capabilities.

To achieve these objectives, the main expected immediate results were:


1. The electoral management bodies (CNE and GTAPE) and actors in electoral processes organize snap presidential elections in March 2012 in an efficient and transparent way for the election of the President of the Republic;
2. Support for electoral management structures and civil society allows voter registration and efficient, transparent and open organization of general elections in 2014 in line with the current legal framework;
3. A long-term civic education program is implemented to increase the participation of citizens in political life, more specifically in the electoral processes, and contribute to ongoing efforts to achieve national reconciliation within the framework of the democratic governance and reform of the security and defense sector;
4. A post-election program of institutional strengthening and sustainable development capacity is available which allows, on the basis of strategic plans available, the transfer of South-South capacity building and experience exchange, national ownership methodologies / election management instruments and rationalization of costs of the electoral process for future election cycles.

The revised PACE II

Objectives	In order to	Results
Support for electoral processes management structures and civil society	Voter registration and efficient, transparent and open organization of general elections in 2014 in line with the current legal framework	All desired results were obtained
Support for elections (including voter registration)	Efficient organization, transparent and free elections	The elections in 2012 were interrupted by the military coup. General elections were conducted successfully in 2014
A long-term program of civic education	Increase citizen participation in electoral processes and contribute to ongoing efforts to achieve national reconciliation within the framework of democratic governance and reform of the security and defense sector	The program has not been started ²
Institutional strengthening and development of the CNE and other electoral actors	The transfer of skills and exchange of South-South experience, national ownership of methodologies / tools for electoral management and rationalization of costs of elections	Reached only in part

² While it is true that the PACE has not achieved permanent civic education, yet the mobilization and short-term civic education conducted before the elections contributed to the increase in the number of voters. In addition, after the coup, PACE was dormant because of the sanctions imposed by the donor community and the absence of the CNE.

The project had 5 components:



Description of the Operation

The purpose and scope of the assessment is to evaluate the results of the support given by the Electoral Cycle Support Program (PACE II), funded by the European Union and implemented by UNDP, covering the period 2012-2014. The assessment will provide useful information to development partners on the best strategies to finance elections and points that require more international support.

The criteria and evaluation issues are relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the project and how the project addressed gender considerations. In its analysis, the evaluation takes into account the political, social and economic environment in which the project was implemented.

These findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations of the evaluation will eventually improve the approaches and strategies of UNDP to support the electoral management bodies and electoral processes in particular, and support the strengthening of democratic institutions in general.

The results of the evaluation will also try to inform the electoral management bodies on how to improve the management of electoral processes, in order to ensure their fairness and transparency. In addition, the evaluation will provide important information for CSOs and other stakeholders on the entry points and the best approaches to accompany the elections.

For the *evaluation methodology*, description of data collection methods and data sources used, information collection tools, and discussion and contributions of others about the reliability and validity of the assessment are analysed in the subdivision *Methodological approach*.

The *evaluation matrix* identifies key questions about the evaluation and how to respond with the chosen methods (see Appendix 4).

The schedule of key stages, performances and responsibilities demonstrates that the consultant has completed all the terms of reference, as well as the tasks that would be allocated to the national consultant (see schedule of activities, Appendix 11).

For *framing of results*, it should be stressed that a particular care was taken when comments from stakeholders have been asked for, in order not to compromise the independence of the judgments made during the evaluation, which is by its very nature an independent operation. The process of developing a management response to the terminal evaluation allowed for a reflection on the results of the project and draw lessons from it.

The scope of the assessment, that is to say, the key questions the evaluation seeks to answer to, the main assumptions underlying the strategy defined by the PRODOC are: has PACE increased the effectiveness and efficiency of the electoral process in the short term and in the longer term, as well as its sustainability and independence from international assistance? Has it overcome the challenges

and shortcomings identified in the technical, operational and short-term logistics and developed the capacity of stakeholders and structures responsible for the management of long-term process? Did it also take into account issues such as security and political conflicts related to electoral processes, as well as gender equity through the promotion of synergies with the specialized agencies and other ongoing programs of development partners?

All strategic aspects are linked to national priorities, the priorities of the UNDAF, fund framework, and other plans and specific objectives of the program or the country. In line with the Paris Declaration and the principles of International Engagement in Fragile States and precarious situations, the United Nations system has developed, in collaboration with the Government of Guinea-Bissau, the United Nations Framework Plan for Assistance (UNDAF) for 2013-2017, in order to contribute to achieving the priorities for peace building and development in Guinea Bissau. The United Nations contribution to achieving the priorities contained in the priority areas of cooperation is noticeable through seven effects:

- i) national institutions are effectively implementing institutional, legislative and administrative reforms, to promote good governance, political dialogue and social cohesion;
- ii) the Defence, Security and Justice Institutions are professionalized and respect the principles of the rule of law and human rights;
- iii) populations enjoy more their rights and freedoms with regard to access to justice and to quality security services in the targeted areas;
- iv) National institutions implement effectively adequate gender sensitive policies and strategies, to promote sustainable economic development;
- v) the most vulnerable populations in the poorest regions have greater access to economic opportunities;
- vi) national institutions and civil society provide the population with quality social basic services, particularly for the benefit of the most vulnerable groups; and
- vi) the most vulnerable groups in the poorest areas have access to and greater use of quality social basic services.

The eight priorities are:

- (I) reduction of expenses of the public service through the restructuring and modernization of public institutions, including those related to defense and security forces;
- (Ii) allocation of operational legal and judicial institutions, accessible to the population at central and regional level;
- (Iii) achieving universal primary education by 2015;
- (Iv) increasing access to drinking water up to 80% in 2015 (66% in 2010);
- (V) reducing the incidence of poverty at the national level of 69.3% (in 2010) to 59% in 2015 and extreme poverty from 33% to 20% taking into account the disparities between men and women ;
- (Vi) reduction of structural inequalities between men and women;
- (Vii) reduction of infant and child mortality rate of 113 and 150 respectively for 1000 live births in 2010 to 90 and 120 per 1000 live births in 2015; and

(Viii) reducing the maternal mortality rate from 800 to 600 per 100,000 births between 2011 and 2015.

The electoral processes experienced problems at the institutional level, which always demand a solution. Among these, some may be mentioned:

- 1) the non-permanent structures of local electoral management, making it difficult capitalizing lessons learned from successive elections;
- 2) the multiplicity of institutional players, resulting in difficulties in coordination and articulation between the various bodies involved in the organization of elections;
- 3) the practical inability to manage the electoral roll according to the laws, involving the need to start from scratch each time, with all its financial implications in the short and long term;
- 4) operating in emergency mode in each election, given the moments of crisis in the country, and consequently difficulty in appropriation of procedural, technology and methodology innovations introduced in several countries (lack of long-term schedule).

In this context, the general objective of the project was revised to allow support for electoral management structures and electoral actors to contribute to improve the framework of democratic governance in Guinea-Bissau, through the organization of participated, efficient and transparent elections in the 2012-2014 electoral cycle and the development of institutional capacities and institutions responsible for the management of these processes.

Taking into account the achievements and challenges identified by the evaluations of the 2008-2010 electoral cycle in Guinea-Bissau and the capacity development program of Pro PALOP-TL in 2010 and 2011, the activities of PACE II revolve around four specific objectives, namely:

1. Support for electoral management structures and stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau for the implementation of voter cards delivery operations (2nd tour) and elections for snap presidential elections in March 2012;
2. Support for elections (including voter registration) as part of the general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013;
3. Civic education in a long term perspective of political participation (especially women and disadvantaged groups), peace building and articulation of the reform of the security and defense sector in a framework of democratic governance;
4. Institutional strengthening and capacity building of the National Elections Commission (CNE), the Technical Office to Support Voter Registration (GTAPE) and other electoral stakeholders with a view to transfer capabilities, experience and peer learning exchanges South-South allowing the sustainable development of these structures, institutions and groups.

It is important to note that these objectives are articulated with substantial support of the Pro PALOP-TL in technical assistance made available for the benefit of the CNE, GTAPE and Supreme Court in the context of the snap presidential elections in 2012. This project also makes a considerable contribution for the delivery operations of voters card (2nd tour), and the transmission and verification of election results with a total contribution of 418,000 US Dollars.

As already pointed out, these objectives aim at contributing to the implementation of the strategic plan of the electoral management structures in Guinea Bissau through the project, specifically its three preferred approaches, including joint support for elections planned for the 2012-2014 electoral cycle and institutional development and sustainable building, in close coordination with the Pro PALOP-TL.

To achieve these objectives, the expected results of the PACE II are:

1. The electoral management bodies (CNE and GTAPE) and actors in electoral processes organize snap presidential elections in March 2012 in an efficient and transparent way allowing for the election of the President of the Republic (partially realized);
2. Support for electoral management structures and civil society allows voter registration and efficient, transparent and free general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013, in line with the legal framework in accordance with its legal mandate and the electoral standards contained in international treaties ratified by the State of Guinea-Bissau in the framework of the United Nations and non-conventional standards adopted within the African Union;
3. A long term civic education program is started to increase citizen participation in politics, more specifically in the electoral process, and contribute to ongoing efforts to achieve national reconciliation within the framework of the democratic governance and reform of the security and defense sector;
4. A post-election program of institutional strengthening and sustainable development capacity is available which, on the basis of strategic plans, allows the transfer of South-South capacity building and experience exchange, the national ownership of methodologies / election management instruments and rationalization of costs of the electoral process for future election cycles.

These results were pursued through close collaboration with the 2010-2012 Electoral Support Project Cycles to PALOP and Timor-Leste (Pro PALOP-TL), in particular on the basis of close coordination and articulation of management structures of the two projects that are conducted under direct management by UNDP. Technical support of the management unit of the Pro PALOP-TL, and also the articulation with the Missions, specialized agencies and programs of the United Nations in the framework of political dialogue in Guinea-Bissau has been exploited in the implementation the activities of this project.

The project strategy was aligned with the United Nations Framework Plan for Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the "Operational Guidelines" for the implementation of electoral assistance projects and programs signed between UNDP and the EU European, and the roles and responsibilities specified in the Revised Note Guide of the Department of Political Affairs / Electoral Assistance Division (DPA / EAD) of the United Nations and of UNDP for Electoral Assistance.

The project strategy was based on the articulation of complementary approaches to capitalize on the gains recognized in the organization and management of electoral process in Guinea-Bissau, on the basis of lessons learned in the assistance to the Guinea-Bissau electoral cycle (especially in the

support project for 2010-2012 electoral cycles in the PALOP and Timor-Leste - Pro PALOP-TL, funded by the EU for a total of 6.1 MEURO for a period of 45 months up to 31 December 2013³). This approach aimed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the electoral processes in the short term and, in the longer term, sustainability and independence from international assistance.

In other words, overcoming the challenges and shortcomings identified at technical, operational and short-term logistics level and developing the capacity of actors and structures responsible for the management of these long-term processes was the basic challenge. This approach also takes into account issues such as security and political conflicts related to electoral processes, as well as gender equity through the promotion of synergies with the specialized agencies ongoing programs and other development partners in the country.

Revised strategy, articulation Pro PALOP-TL - PACE II

The strategy of Pro PALOP-TL in Guinea-Bissau had to be revised to also provide an effective response to the needs of the snap presidential elections in 12 March 2012. Thus, special attention was given to these operations in the project strategy to enable Guinea-Bissau development partners to provide critical emergency assistance in order to help electoral management bodies and political authorities to get rid again of a period of constitutional exception.

The link between the initiatives of the Pro PALOP-TL and those planned under PACE II was thus very important to maximize the impact and ensure more effective results for the 2012-2014 electoral cycles in Guinea-Bissau. For this reason, the activities plan of the Pro PALOP-TL was revised in 2012 by the supervisory and decision structures of this project to articulate with PACE II the support for 2012 presidential elections. In 2013 and given the context, the work plan of the Pro PALOP-TL for 2013 in Guinea-Bissau was reviewed again at the request of the EU Delegation in Guinea-Bissau, to face the need for capacity building of the executive secretariat of the CNE.

In 2012, this review has helped to produce an immediate impact in the shortest time for

- (1) the establishment of electoral expertise (logistics expert, a finance/ administration expert and a civic education expert) in support of the management unit of the Pro PALOP-TL that was exceptionally dedicated to the electoral process in Guinea-Bissau (CTP, Electoral Assistance specialist, National electoral Officer, International communications Junior Officer);
- (2) in the field of voters card delivery operations (2nd tour);
- (3) voter information on these extraordinary delivery operations of voter cards; and
- (4) support to the Supreme Court for pre-electoral (contestants) and post-election disputes (first tour litigation).

In 2013, the revision of the PTA allowed

- (1) to support the voter registration operations through voter information campaigns;

³ Based on an extension without costs, granted in March 2013.

- (2) to train members of the Executive Secretariat in the field of election administration; also
- (3) to facilitate a retreat including the Executive Secretariat, its regional departments and commissions in order to operationally prepare the electoral process; and
- (4) to produce a documentary on the 2013 electoral process as a fundamental step in ending the political transition process starting from the previous processes as a baseline.

The three PACE II approaches concern specifically:

- (1) Continuation / deepening of support to the electoral cycle paradigm based on the lessons learned from the assistance to the electoral cycle and the comparative experience in this area, through actions of capacity building and long-term institutional capacity building. On one hand, the project strategy is fully in line with the United Nations Framework Plan for Development Assistance (UNDAF) and the Action Plan of the Country Programme. On the other hand, it aligns and respects the national development policies such as the DENARP I and II, or the support and strengthening of other players' building capacity programs in the governance sector such as parliaments and the security forces in dealing with electoral processes.
- (2) Strengthening coordination and highlighting possible synergies between the activities of the project and those ongoing or planned under the 2010-2012 Electoral Cycles Support Program in the PALOP and Timor Leste (Pro PALOP -TL). The PALOP-TL Pro was a project of capacity building for electoral management structures, parliaments and parliamentarians, as well as civilian actors in electoral processes. PACE II closely articulated the 2011-2013 election cycle support with the current activities and planned work plans of the Pro PALOP-TL in Guinea Bissau in 2011 and 2012 in view of the planned elections. This articulation / coordination would bring a strong and sustainable support to national actors.
- (3) The design of the project components and activities allowed them an interdependent but still autonomous form of implementation to meet the resource mobilization challenges, but also to address the weaknesses identified in the assistance.

Unforeseen events, new plans

While the country was preparing to hold parliamentary elections in November 2012, the death of President Malam Bacai Sanhá has plunged the country into a constitutional exception period and the need to organize again presidential elections within 60 days.

Guinea-Bissau's development partners have mobilized in very tight and almost unrealistic deadlines a total of 5.5 million US dollars⁴ to fully fund these elections of exceptional character. This support has been present since the first elections in the country and the EU has always been a fundamental

⁴ Includes the contribution of the Republic of South Africa, US \$ 663.130 (equivalent to 500,000 EURO), made available only in 2013.

partner contributing either through common baskets (managed by UNDP), or through direct support to national actors.⁵

The common basket of partners was the PACE II funding mechanism and funded the pre-election phase and the first round of the elections, the presidential elections of March 18, 2012 - including the latest activities of that phase until April 12, 2012.

Unfortunately, despite the efforts of development partners for the mobilization and rapid availability of funds, as well as the considerable efforts of the CNE to ensure the proper organization of elections, the second round of presidential elections of March 18, 2012 was not held because of a military coup that occurred on April 12, 2012.

Since then the country and its democratic institutions are faced, once again, to an exception period marked by a phase called "democratic transition", that should last 12 months and in fact lasted 24 months.

The first quarter of 2013 was marked by strong political activity to build important consensus between national stakeholders and international partners to engage on the basis of the following targets:

1. to form a more inclusive and consensual government with the purpose of organizing general elections in 2013;
2. to create the necessary conditions to hold general elections before the end of 2013.

These targets have been assumed by the government and the national authorities, who officially requested in May 2013 United Nations support for the organization and financing of general elections before the end of 2013. On this basis, the PACE II, which was the main instrument of financial and technical support from development partners of Guinea-Bissau in electoral processes scheduled in the 2012-14 election cycle, had to be updated. The revision of the PACE II helped to take stock of the support to the operations of failed elections of 18 March 2012 and to review the components to provide support for general elections scheduled for the third quarter of 2013.

Total resources

The Election Support project that gave birth to PACE II (2012-2014 Electoral Cycle Support Program) began in February 2012, with closing date scheduled for December 2013 but extended to two weeks after the second round of elections presidential elections, which took place May 18, 2014.

PACE II project involved, for the 2014 general elections (presidential and legislative) a total budget of USD **6,796,424** from multilateral funding from ten different sources of funding, the United Kingdom, Turkey, South Africa, the European Commission, Pakistan, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Brazil, as well as the United Nations Fund for Peacebuilding (PBF).

⁵ 4.7 million US dollars for the 2008/09 cycle - 40% of the common basket. In 2005, the EU also contributed to the basket with about 2.2 Million USD.

The total amount of actual expenditure up to 31 December 2014 is USD **6 766 997.82**, representing an implementation rate of 99.57% of the budget mobilized.

The budgetary resources are composed of the remaining contributions of funds for the 2012 presidential elections and of the contributions granted by donors in 2013 and 2014.

PACE II financing (in USD)

DONOR	2013 BUDGET	2014 BUDGET	TOTAL BUDGET
UK	56 931	330 579	387 510
TURKEY	98 870		98 870
SOUTH AFRICA	663 130	684 099	1 347 229
PAKISTAN	10 000		10 000
NIGERIA	228 131		228 131
JAPAN	50 533		50 533
BRAZIL	106 644		106 644
PBF		796 080	796 080
PBF/UNWOMEN		179 653	179 653
ITALY		13 755	13 755
EU	2 578 019		2 578 019
JAPAN		1 000 000	1 000 000
TOTAL	3 792 258	3 004 166	6 796 424

Indeed, following the interruption of the electoral process in 2012 in Guinea Bissau consecutive to the military coup of April, the second round of presidential elections could not be held as previewed. The remaining rather substantial financial resources caused by this impromptu halt to the electoral process from April 2012 has been added to new resources mobilized at the resumption of the electoral process in 2013. The total therefore constituted the PACE II budget.

In 2009, resource mobilization has benefited from lessons learned from the electoral process in 2008, by endowing the election administration of financial resources on time to meet the pre-electoral process and thereby respect the electoral timetable. Government funding and inputs from partners played a fundamental role in this regard.

Unfortunately, these gains have not been consolidated and sustained throughout the 2012-2014 election cycle, due to the general elections of 2014. Some donors have opted to implement other mechanisms to support the electoral process, outside the basket fund managed by UNDP.

Because of this option of some donors to stay out of the basket fund managed by UNDP and instead directly support the Government in the registration process, UNDP could not follow directly the use given to the funds allocated by these donors, particularly in the phase of the electoral registration. Therefore, the data contained in this report have been completely extracted from the report of GTAPE.

The total approved budget for the general elections of 2014 was USD 19.31 million (9.55 billion F.CFA). Of this amount, a total of USD 12.54 million (6.20 billion F.CFA) was allocated to the registration phase in the electoral roll, of which USD 4.54 million (2.24 billion F. CFA) for the purchase of biometric voter registration kits.

UNDP provided technical assistance for the preparation of the electoral budget and for the definition of technical specifications for equipment purchased and used for voter registration. Meanwhile, UNDP has also contributed to the public awareness activities for the electoral registration phase with an amount of 22 million Francs CFA.

The registration process was conducted by the Timor Leste Cooperation Agency. However, the PACE II project also participated in the financing by granting the CNE a sum of USD 78 848.34, or 1.17% of the executed budget, for the supervision of registration operations outside the country. The other components of the registration process were not covered by the project.

The CNE has moved to new headquarters equipped by UNDP. The funds taken from the PACE II project balance of funds in 2012, covered the costs of rehabilitation and the acquisition of computer equipment and furniture, as well as the installation costs in the new premises.

UNDP also strengthened the capacity of the CNE with modern equipment (computer room) which allows them to carry out the verification of registration data, and later to the collection and processing of election results and permanent maintenance of databases on electoral processes.

The acquisitions of election materials (ballot boxes, indelible ink, ballot papers and other printed forms, etc.) were executed through PSO, UNDP service center based in Copenhagen, Denmark. Different providers are: ELECTION COPENHAGEN A / S, REN-FORM CC, UTHOTECH EXPORTS, Indra Sistemas SA, KUEHNE + NAG.

The general overall objective was the capacity building strengthening of women and men from Guinea-Bissau civil society in monitoring violence during elections and it was taken into account with a memorandum signed with ONUFEMME.

The support of PACE II project to the implementation of the electoral process has contributed to a peaceful, transparent and free general election, with results widely accepted by all national and international stakeholders.

Thanks to the strong mobilization of technical and financial partners who have provided financial support to the will of the authorities to close the electoral cycle begun in 2012, the professionalism of the National Elections Commission, thanks to the crucial role played by UNDP in the mobilization and management of resources, the provision of appropriate technical expertise in different fields (education, civic education, acquisitions, logistics, legal support, etc.) through the PACE II project,

Guinea-Bissau was able to carry out a transparent electoral process which has enabled the country to overcome the crisis in which the April 2012 coup plunged it and therefore return to constitutional order.

- **Human resources**

PACE II had in its team the following personnel:

- 1 project manager
- 1 financial specialist
- 1 national project manager
- 1 communication officer
- 1 chief technical adviser (up to the coup).

A team of international experts (planning, logistics, administration & finance, civic education and international UN Volunteers) and national experts (communication, lawyers and UN national volunteers) was recruited by UNDP to support national institutions in budget preparation, operations planning and civic education to support the elections.

Specifically, UNDP supported the CNE and GTAPE to:

- Finalize and refine the electoral budget after difficulties related to the type of registration (biometric or manual); the total cost of the elections have been identified in a very difficult context of lack of coordination between the various national structures;
- Definition of slogans for the voter registration and creation for the first time of an institutional logotype for GTAPE;
- revision of the electoral timetable to align it with the date of April 13, 2014 fixed for the holding of presidential and legislative elections;
- Prepare and implement an operational plan for the presidential and legislative elections (as part of a technical committee for the monitoring and implementation of elections (to strengthen coordination between the actors), including operation logistics (transportation, deployment and organization of all election materials from the CNE to the Regional Commissions, from them to polling stations and vice versa), and the securisation of voting materials;
- Develop a plan of acquisition of electoral documents and materials;
- Conceive a cash flow plan for expenditures and disbursements foreseen in the presidential and legislative elections;
- Develop and implement programs of information on the registration process, a civic education program of the CNE and civic education initiatives of civil society (especially dedicated to young voters and women);

- Develop training modules and training of election officials, including representatives of political parties.

Geographical area - the whole country.

The component 1, initially planned to help ensure the efficient organization of presidential elections on 18 March 2012, remained a reference for the revised PACE II. The budget for this component was executed and reflects the expenses of the basket with pre-electoral operations and the 1st round of the elections.

Component 2 of the project was to provide technical and financial support to the voter registration operations. This component would be revised in order to adjust this support depending on the option taken by the national authorities regarding the modality of the voters registration.

Component 3 of the project was updated to capture the activities and additional costs resulting from the coupling of legislative and presidential elections in a single operation.

Components 3 and 5 have not been revised since they were dedicated to long-term and post-election support to civic education and institutional strengthening.

The transition period

During this period, the PACE activities could not be fully implemented because some donors have imposed sanctions on the country, which meant that resources from these donors, especially the European Union, have been frozen and could be used to implement activities.

Therefore, the principle of support to the electoral cycles was compromised and activities such as permanent civic education, capacity building of electoral management bodies, etc. could not be implemented after the coup. In addition, since the coup, the National Electoral Commission was dismantled and restored only on the eve of 2014 elections.

Changes in the project to fit the need for funding the 2013 elections and the interruption of key project activities have had important implications for the assessment of the project, in the sense that part the original project objectives could not be achieved and were somehow replaced by new goals. The challenge for the evaluation is to find a balance between the failure of some of the initial objectives and the success of new objectives and come to conclusions about the overall success of the project and its impact.

Social, political, economic and institutional factors. Geographical landscape

Guinea-Bissau is located in West Africa and has an area of 36,125 Km². The country is one of the poorest in the world, with a GDP / capita of \$ 254 in 2007 and a Human Development Index of 0.396 in 2009, placing Guinea-Bissau at the 173rd position out of 182 countries.

Almost two thirds (65.7%) of the population live on less than two (2) dollars per day and 21.4% below one (1) dollar a day. In 2006 it was estimated that unemployment in Bissau city affects 46.87% of youth aged 15 to 24, against 19.34% in the country. Geographically, Guinea-Bissau is a complex country, although relatively small. The country is very irrigated by rivers and composed of a myriad of islands with serious accessibility problems.

The very low level of human development in Guinea-Bissau is related to economic development delay and the widespread under-equipment of the country for several decades. This is basically explained both by the low level of monetary income and the precariousness of the populations' health due to difficulties of access to health services and the degradation of their environment.

Small country located in West Africa, Guinea Bissau is geographically positioned between Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. It has a population of 1,449,230 inhabitants, of which 51.6% women and 50.2% young people between 15 and 35 (2009 Population and Housing General Census). The country is governed by the 1996 Constitution, which enshrined the semi-presidential system. The country is divided into eight administrative regions populated by a variety of ethno-linguistic groups. The capital, Bissau, assumes the status of autonomous sector. The target population of PACE II was all those who had completed 18 years until April 2014 (775,508 citizens).

Guinea-Bissau enjoys favorable climatic conditions and has huge agro-ecological and mining potential, significant assets for sustainable economic development. However, analysis of the development situation highlighted significant challenges related to strengthening the rule of law and republican institutions, the establishment of a stable and attractive business environment, promoting economic development and rehabilitation of human capital development level.

At the present time, the socio-economic situation is marked by economic activities for survival and development in recent years of illicit activities related to drug trafficking and small arms. The average annual economic growth rate is 2.5% since 2006, while the growth was around 3.0% in 2009. Inflation reached 4.6% in 2007 and 10.4% in 2008, because of the rising prices of food and petroleum products. The debt burden is excessive (2.5 times the GDP) and the fiscal situation remains critical, with a ratio Public Revenue / GDP of between 5% and 10%. The sovereignty expenses are hardly ensured by the state.

The weak financial capacity of the state and disruption of public administration explain the low investment rates of support infrastructures for economic activities, although progress has been made in telecommunications, banking intermediation and financial sectors (four banks operating in the country and more than a hundred micro-finance institutions) and public works.

Regarding democratic governance, since independence in 1973 and its transition to democracy begun in 1991, the country remains strongly marked by political instability, impunity and the weakening of the rule of law.

The analysis of the evolution of the political system in Guinea-Bissau indicates that, since independence, the political system has evolved from authoritarian to a democratic form of government. This process remains incomplete, because characterized by recurrent instability, marked

by violations of human rights and disrespect of human life. Regular transgressions of constitutional order have often resulted in the seizure of power by the military class or supported by the military.

Basically, Guinea Bissau has been mainly characterized, especially during the period when PACE was in effect, by a political and institutional instability fueled by political tensions and recurrent interference of the military in the political game. This has compromised the building-up of the rule of law and the promotion of sustainable economic development. Guinea-Bissau remains a "fragile state" because of the weakness of its institutions, its high vulnerability to political conflict and low resilience to external shocks.

During the 90s, the country enjoyed relative political and institutional stability which enabled the Government to resume the dialogue with development partners and record a positive economic and social performance.

But in December 2011 and early 2012, the political situation was marked by turmoil within the armed forces and their political interference and by the death of the President, which yet did not upset the constitutional order. The political transition has been initiated in accordance with the constitutional provisions. However, partisan political tensions within the political class and the questions raised by some parties on the electoral process constituted undeniable risk factors that have undermined the holding of presidential elections scheduled for 18 March 2012 and have pushed the country in a worrying uncertainty situation.

Efforts by development partners in facilitating political dialogue and the organization of elections have not helped to defuse the political tensions in order to meet the challenge of holding free and transparent elections on the previewed delays.

The serious political crisis of 2012-2014 was overcome. The challenge that arises now is "to significantly reduce poverty in its many dimensions by creating more revenue opportunities, jobs and improved access to quality public basic services in a strengthened state", prime objective of DENARP II, the document elaborated by the Government with the support of development partners. This will not happen without a particular commitment to strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions. This is the main challenge.

Concordance between the effects of the PACE project, the country program (CPD) and the framework of United Nations. The UNDAF effect

The expected results of the PACE program fit perfectly under the frame of the effect of the UN Framework Plan for Development Assistance (UNDAF), "Meeting the Challenge of the Millennium Development Goals." They are also in line with the national priority: strengthening governance, modernizing public administration and ensuring macroeconomic stability as defined in the context of the results of the CPD. Indeed, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals depends largely on the principles of good governance and good governance starts with the conduct of credible and transparent free elections, an expression of the popular will through the ballot box in one hand and a collective consciousness conquered to the respect for human rights and the preservation of national heritage.

Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The parameters of the evaluation, key partners

In the implementation of this project, UNDP has collaborated with a number of national entities, the National Electoral Commission being the main implementing partner. There were a number of responsible partners who contributed to the implementation of the project, namely:



- The CNE whose competence is to oversee the voters registration, organize and conduct elections and referendums and promote civic education (CE) of citizens;
- The Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), which, at its expenses, organizes and implements the voter registration at the national level. as well as their necessary updates – a succession of revised legal articles on this matter have passed this responsibility for the CNE, to return again to GTAPE / MAT;
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), whose competence is to organize and carry out the voter registration abroad;
- The Supreme Tribunal of Justice (STJ), which must carry out the verification of candidatures and decide on appeals and protests over the CNE decisions.

Moreover, even if in a lesser degree, in practice, the President (setting the dates for presidential and legislative elections) and Courts (appreciation of the compatibility of acts of the voter registration and appeals relating to decisions by the registration commissions) are also involved in the various phases of the electoral process. In this context, the institutional relations between the CNE and the MAT in the framework of the completion of the voter registration and its respective updates, deserve special attention.

In addition to national implementing partners, the project has worked closely with international partners who financed the project under the multi Basket Fund, namely: European Union, United Kingdom, Turkey, South Africa, Pakistan, Nigeria, Brazil, PBF / UN Women, Japan, Italy, Commission for Peace Building, Angola, Spain, UNDP, ECOWAS, Germany, France, etc. In addition to providing funding for the project, the international partners have promoted the implementation of the project and general elections through the mechanisms of the Project Monitoring Committee, the management structure.

The roles and responsibilities of different PACE partners

- From the national counterpart :



Evaluation Objectives

The evaluation should answer fundamental questions divided in the following five evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.

1 Relevance of the results

- The objectives and expected results are relevant to national priorities?

They are clear and realistic in view of available resources?

The interventions are relevant?

Planned institutional arrangements are adequate in relation to challenges?

The results framework (indicators) defined is relevant and adapted for measuring results?

What are the strengths and weaknesses in the design?

2 Project Efficiency

- What progress toward the outcomes has been achieved? To what extent the results of the project contributed to the achievement of project objectives? What are the key challenges for each component of the project? • How the project results have contributed to the effect CPD? • What are the external factors that have contributed to the realization of the effect or not? • What are the main difficulties encountered and which are the causes? • How coordination structures in place in the project have worked?

3 Efficiency and project management

- What is the rate of implementation at the global level and component? To what extent are resources invested in the implementation framework of each component were they used optimally in terms of results achieved? • Was the project managed efficiently? The methods chosen for the performance they have achieved the intended results?

4 Sustainability, national ownership and capacity building

- What was the degree of ownership of each component by the Government? • To what extent were the cooperation strategies and programs institutionalized? • To what extent the positive changes in the field will continue in the future? • To what extent national capacities of the government, the CNE, civil society and communities have been strengthened? The capabilities developed and / or strengthened have produced lasting effects? • The complementarity, cooperation and synergy between the development partners will be sustainable?

5 Evaluating Gender Equality and Women's Development

- How has the project contributed to the inclusion of the gender dimension? • To what extent the project has contributed to the promotion of women's participation in elections? What must we do better for the next electoral cycles?

Methodological Approach

The consultant focused on key areas of the scope of PACE II report outlining its findings. The other member of the team - the national consultant - was not integrated because no candidate was selected. So the consultant assumed all the responsibilities and tasks of the Terms of Reference (see Annex 1).

The consultant has determined a schedule. The work plan was revised on a daily basis to ensure that new information or new priorities were evaluated and adequately addressed in the previewed work plan.

Documentation review

In the early days of the evaluation, the consultant received a list of contacts and documentation to consult. The consultant studied the documents and established a prioritization for the reading materials to ensure maximum understanding of the needs of the study and adapt the interviews around the information already collected. If the consultant requires new materials or useful documentation that can be provided by UNDP, a formal request will be submitted to the appropriate people.

Interviews

The consultant liaises with UNDP staff, requesting interviews, and constantly updates her schedule to ensure maximum capitalization of the time at her disposal. The consultant gives priority to a possible contact persons list received from UNDP to ensure that all key persons are contacted in the first weeks of the mission. Given the fact that time is limited, the consultant will schedule, if appropriate, individual and ministerial meetings. When people are not available, electronic consultations or telephone interviews are conducted.

The consultant uses the contact list established as her primary contact list, but during the mission establishes new contacts. The consultant will interview a representative sample of stakeholders to achieve an overall balanced and fair view of the project.

Data baseline

The consultant will fulfill the needs of the evaluation and not base her findings only on deductions envisaged for the project. The consultant assesses the main components of the project in line with the scope and objectives in the ToR. The consultant does not attempt to highlight only the successes and the positive results of the project but draws attention to the challenges and difficulties encountered during the project life. The evaluation also includes best practices and lessons learned and provides recommendations to mitigate possible future obstacles and promote continued best practices.

The evaluation focuses mainly on the contribution of outputs to the project results and their likely impact, relevance and overall sustainability. The project document and reports that resulted from it are used to determine the main baselines. However, in order to verify the relevance and effectiveness of the project, the consultant also uses basic information from statistics and reports arising from the period prior to the implementation of the project, including the statistics of past elections.

Methodology

The consultant uses a mixed method approach based on qualitative and quantitative data. These include a comprehensive literature review, design of open interviews and structured questionnaires or surveys. Interviews were held with all key stakeholders, including project staff, the National Electoral Commission, civil society, the media, political parties, donors, domestic monitors and international observers. If people are not physically accessible at the time of the evaluation, the consultant attempts to contact the relevant stakeholders by phone, skype or email.

Following a comprehensive review of data and opinions, and after establishing an adequate reference base, the consultant analyses the content of interviews and guidelines to follow during interviews. However, it should be noted that, to gather as much information as possible, primary interviews have an open-ended format to allow greater affluence and diversity of information. More oriented sessions are structured around specific issues that the consultant considers important after the initial information gathering and analysis. Specific questionnaires are designed for this purpose and statistical analysis and the conclusions are gathered from the said questionnaires / surveys.

Detailed method

1st. Identify existing information: obtain the necessary data through semi-structured interviews and customized questionnaires, focus groups, workshops, and self-assessment tools;

2nd. Identify the capabilities needed for the future;

3rd. Summarize and interpret the results comparing the level of desired capacity in relation to the level of existing capacity to determine if the level of existing capacity is sufficient or needs improvement and identifying where to focus the capacity development strategy;

4th. Create a sustainable capacity development strategy: select the entry point, the basic issues and the functional and technical capabilities;

5th. Develop recommendations on what needs to be done, by whom, when and resources;

6th. Organize a validation workshop or discussion session on capacity development and evaluation of stakeholder capacity

7th. Prepare the evaluation report.

Data analysis

The first phase of the evaluation was the review of documents relating to PACE II (see Annex 2, List of operating documents) and interviews with the only remaining member of PACE II program.

A compilation was made by the consultant of the collected data. Turning to the second phase, the consultant has begun a round of interviews (see Annex 6, List of persons met or interviewed or consulted groups) and collected further written documents. These contacts were supplemented by information received from four leaders of regional committees of Elections (Bissau, Cacheu, Gabu and Bafatá) and a field visit to the facilities of the Regional Elections Committee to Mansoa.

The consultant also sent a written questionnaire to the CNE and six CSOs (see Annex 7) and a survey to 9 consultants who have worked with PACE II (see Annex 8).

The aim was to compare the data coming from several sources, crossing them to confirm or not different information or opinions.

This data analysis and potential omissions and limitations may affect the way the findings can be interpreted. Conclusions could be drawn that are not in agreement with those set forth in this document. It is a risk ex post evaluation that is left to the criterion of readers and commentators.

Unfortunately the consultant could not count on the feedback and suggestions of a national consultant, which would have brought new qualities to her activity, because the national consultant would support the mission with his/her abilities, among which “extensive experience in the governance domain” (ToR).

The consultant has worked to make a collection of the most participatory data possible, in order to maximize the contribution of beneficiaries and stakeholders in the evaluation. She made the triangulation of data and used methodologies to monitor the quality and validity of information, excluding those data that proved unreliable and prioritizing those that were more recurrent and consensual.

Under the terms of reference, the financing of this mission was supported by the budget of PACE II project. The total budget covering the costs associated with this evaluation is USD 40,000, including USD 30,000 for the international consultant.⁶ The consultant has completed all the terms of reference, as well as the tasks that would be assigned in the national consultant (see schedule of activities, Annex 11).

⁶ The total budget covering the costs associated with this evaluation is USD 40,000, including USD 30,000 for the international consultant. The consultant has completed all the terms of reference, as well as the tasks that would be assigned in the national consultant (see schedule of activities, Annex 11).

Component 1: Operational support to snap presidential elections March 2012

Table 1: Status of Expected Results - Component 1

Desired results	Indicators	Targets	Achieved results
The electoral management bodies (CNE and GTAPE) and actors in electoral processes organize snap presidential elections in March 2012 in an efficient and transparent way for the election of the President	N/A	The voters card delivery are handled and for the snap presidential elections of 18 March 2012 monitored effectively allowing voters to exercise their franchise in the entire national territory	Not reached because political actors decided that a new electoral registration should not be started.
	N/A	Communication with field teams and follow-up by the GTAPE coordinating team of delivery of new voters cards is assured.	Not reached because it was decided by political actors that a new electoral registration should not be started.
	N/A	The second week of February 2012 at the latest, (1) 3 vehicles (pick-up) are acquired and on the field; (2) field teams are provided with means of transport (vehicles & canoes) for the conduct of field operations as planned

Efficiency

As a result of the death of President Sanhá in January 2012, snap presidential elections had to be prepared for on March 18, 2012, in 60 days. Starting from actions, support and technical assistance of

the Pro PALOP-TL in Guinea-Bissau, it was possible to urgently review all plans and the electoral timetable to align with the new election timetable.

The PMU Integrated (Pro PALOP+PACE II) ensured the daily management of the project and of the common basket. The overall management of this component was the project manager's responsibility with the help of short-term consultants and other experts who supported the daily management of the components. The quality of inputs for each component was guaranteed by the procurement process of the UNDP. The head of the component prepared and presented weekly narrative work plans until the end of elections.

Because the work plans were not monitored by a frame of Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) that could articulate the technical tasks with the broader issues of political development, it was not possible to accurately measure the consequences of the decision to work on a registration roll dating back to 2008 and whose shortcomings had already been recognized by the CNE itself, even if only by the fact that hundreds of thousands of unregistered youth would be excluded from voting.⁷

Obviously PACE II could not do anything to "force" the situation, it was quite out of its competence and PACE had to respect national sovereignty. One definitely cannot make PACE responsible on this. But it had to weigh more carefully this source of weakness and support more strongly the position of the CNE when interacting with national and international actors. It was the opinion of this sovereign body which advocated the need for a new, updated voter registration, an apparently technical aspect which nevertheless served as a pretext to the military, among others, to justify the coup.⁸

Moreover, the military coup of 12 April 2012 and its consequences on the whole process had been pre-identified in the draft document prior to its revision as a political risk beyond the control of management and project action that should merit special attention of all national and international actors.

An indicator of inefficiency mentioned in the final report of the PACE activities is the training of officers of polling stations, "the weak point of the program," according to the narrative and financial final report of UNDP / CNE. The plan developed with the support of the expert in civic and voter education was not implemented in its entirety by decision of the Secretariat of the CNE, against the advice of the technical department of civic education and training. Training of members of polling stations was completed by way of a more limited program (in fact, the Regional Commissions already had a database of members of polling stations that had integrated the previous elections and they organized a confirmation period of the members in the database. Most of them confirmed his availability).

Also the other reports do not refer to the sum of 86,900 CFA which was delivered to the CNE on the eve of the coup and whose expense documents have not been accepted as valid by the UNDP, because this amount was used by the CNE to pay expenses other than those intended. Apart from

⁷ Forecasts based on the 2011 census of the population estimated 810.000 citizens with active electoral capacity. A total of 775.508 voters were registered, of which 22.312 in the diaspora. This means an increase of 181.743 voters and 23 percent since the 2008 voter registration.

⁸ As a matter of fact, the mission of the Department of Political Affairs would recommend later, in July 2013, ways of exploring cheaper and faster voter registration systems.

this case, which deserved even the personal visit of the deputy representative of UNDP to the CNE facilities in a heavy climate of post-coup, in order to recover the funds - this was the weakest point - the resources of PACE II were used efficiently.

Relevance

The intended targets were not entirely relevant: although they seemed clear and realistic given the available resources, it would have been wise to recognize, in the context of very visible indicators of political instability, a new voter registration as a priority. This aspect, together with the misuse of the sum of 86,900 CFA by the CNE, were the weakest points.

The results and interventions, as well as the planned institutional arrangements, were not accomplished, because the election was interrupted. Thus, the support for the electoral dispute period for the 2nd round was made redundant by the military coup.

Under the terms of national priorities, since the policy decision of the Guinean government to move forward with the polemic electoral lists was contrary to the immediate and long-term interests of the country, the relevance of the intervention of PACE II has been jeopardized, as a side effect. Policy advocacy had not been sufficiently sensitized by the technical component to the harmful effects of a registration with many flaws.

The indicators that were defined by the PRODOC and which served as a guide for PACE II activities were clear and relevant: "The credibility and acceptance of the voter registration results then depend on how this institution does its job and the degree of confidence (or mistrust) that citizens and political parties grant it." The results do not correspond to this indicator.

The Integrated PMU (ProPALOP+PACE II) - The ProPALOP / TL was a program with larger goals, funded in a different way. The merger decision made it lose its autonomy and strategic plan to favor a more immediate and shorter term program. Yet under the immediate perspective of programmed support for PACE II project, the integration of PROPALOP / TL in the PACE II PMU was relevant and produced a rationalization of costs (the same Project manager, the same Financial Specialist and even the same National Project manager). Moreover, these preliminary inputs were possible thanks to the technical support of the Pro PALOP-TL PMU based in Bissau.

PACE II has complemented these inputs with support for technical assistance to regional structures of the CNE and GTAPE with the provision of 9 regional councilors - one per region. These advisors have provided technical and logistical support to CSR and CRE in areas under the guidance of expert operations / electoral logistics recruited by the Pro PALOP-TL and supervision of the CNE. Besides, PACE II provided support to the field operations logistics for the transport and communications of voter registration field teams with the coordination of GTAPE at central level. This was the strongest point of all the activity.

Effectiveness

Considering the ratio between results and objectives, it must be concluded that the activities of Component 1 have allowed the partial conclusion of its role in supporting snap presidential elections.

Support for electoral institutions was rather more factual and focused on the management of the electoral event on the strategic capabilities concerning management of the electoral field as a whole. Also, GTAPE could not prepare the snap election of 2012 by correcting the electoral roll for example. This failure prompted the suspicion that served as breeding ground and a pretext, among many others, for the interruption of voting April 12, 2012.

Sustainability

One cannot quantitatively measure skills transfer, institution building, support for recurrent costs, since there are no statistical data. Were the robustness of the products and the methodological framework received and managed in the environment and the context of Guinea-Bissau with a sustainability perspective?

What it is known is that, although the national authorities are increasingly able to execute their activities, they do so only with strong support from the UNDP and other entities, under the technical or financial point of view, which leads to the conclusion that they are not in a position to hold election cycles without external support.

In addition, in 2014 the time period of support for technical assistance to the CNE was reduced. PACE II concluded that its support in the next election will be only punctual.

Component 2: Support for voter registration operations in the general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013

The technical support within the framework of PACE II helped to make available to GTAPE the expertise of UNDP PSO (Procurement Support Office) to help national actors take an informed decision on which voter registration modality to choose. A study was done by IT experts with various biometric options, a method which seemed already the consensual as early as 2010, even among the political authorities. However, a latter revision of this idea by the parliament led to a technical compromise in favor of a manual "improved" voter registration, that is to say, almost biometric. Finally, after many obstacles, methodological discussions and lack of funds, a Timor-Leste team arrived in the country and has provided technical and financial resources for the execution of the voter registration. The mission of Timor-Leste chose direct support to the CNE and GTAPE, in detriment of the basket fund managed by UNDP, which made impossible the implementation of the results achieved with the technical assistance mission to the voter registration system.

All these events resulted in a delay of seven months between the first announcement of the first election date announced by the government and the date that became possible.

Table 2: Results of Alleged Status - Component 2

Support for voter registration operations for the general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013

Desired results	Indicators	Targets	Achieved results
Support national actors, including CNE, GTAPE, CSOs, media and other stakeholders in the planning and implementation of elections as part of the general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013 in accordance with their legal mandate and the electoral standards contained in international treaties ratified by the State of Guinea-Bissau in the framework of the United Nations and the non-conventional standards adopted within the African Union	Topographic charts of electoral mapping finalized and available	Revision of electoral mapping is done and takes into account local districts	Achieved. With the support of PACE, GTAPE revised electoral mapping and settled for the identification of 2,200 polling stations
	At least 700,000 voter cards distributed throughout the national territory	Equipment specifications and procurement plan developed and procurement of equipment for the voter registration carried out in time	Achieved. UNDP, with the support of PSO, developed the specification of the voter registration in 4 scenarios, which allowed the government to decide on the appropriate method for voter registration operations
	At least 700,000 eligible voters registered within the established timetable	A new voter registration is made more securely and can record at least 700,000 voters on the national territory	Not reached. The voter registration was conducted with the support of Timor-Leste and Nigeria because there were enough resources in PACE II to continue voter registration
	Electoral lists updated and available within the periods prescribed by the electoral calendar	Voter registration operations efficiently organized in the country territory and takes into account the findings of the feasibility study of the voter	Voter registration was conducted with the support of Timor-Leste and Nigeria because there were enough resources in PACE II to continue voter registration. However, UNDP provided logistical support to GETAP for the

		registration in Guinea-Bissau	electoral process.
	Voter information pieces are in public and private, community and local radios	Updating and posting of electoral lists is provided within the time provided by the electoral calendar	Achieved. With PACE support through its civic education program, information on registration stations and card delivery were published in public, local and community radios, thus allowing more than 700,000 voters to receive their voter cards and to vote.

Efficiency

The implementation rate of this component on the part of PACE II was limited. After the initial consultation phase, the methods chosen for the execution were managed differently than what had been envisaged.⁹ Resources invested in the framework of the implementation (UNDP Procurement Support Office expertise and PACE II computer expert) have not been used optimally in terms of results achieved. Yet it was based on this UNDP expert analysis on voter registration options that partners were able to make their decisions.

PACE II placed its global operations expert with Oio and Cacheu Regional Commissions to support correcting dozens of errors committed during the registration, before and during the 2014 elections. The result was that the voters affected were given the opportunity to exercise their right to vote.

Relevance

The objectives and expected results were relevant to national priority targets, they were clear and realistic given the available resources. Yet the previewed arrangements have proved inadequate to meet challenges.

The strong point was the fact that the PACE II provided a solid basis on options for electoral registration. The most obvious weakness was the failure to mobilize resources for the new voter registration. All PACE II options were put aside in favor of other solutions.

⁹ The mission of the Department of Political Affairs recommended in July 2013 to explore cheaper and faster voter registration systems.

Effectiveness

The biometric option adopted by the Timor-Leste experts had been previously proposed by UNDP. Timorese experts have reduced the number of kits and staff, and instead they have extended the time needed for voter registration operations.

However, PACE II facilitated and coordinated the rent of vehicles and canoes for coordination of activities implemented by the CNE and financially supported by the GTAPE regarding voter education for the electoral registration model that would be used, as well as in the announcement of the location of the registration brigades.

In addition, before and during election day, PACE II supported the Oio and Cacheu RECs in the correction of the voter lists, correcting registration errors of dozens of voters who could vote through this intervention.

The Timorese team proposed biometric registration that was already provided in the UNDP analysis, only with a reduced amount of kits.

Sustainability

The GTAPE and CNE ability to accommodate the new systems and their capacity to meet the storage requirements necessary for voter registration data and the improved communication with regional staff can be credited to some extent to PACE II support and its efforts to provide with facilities and equipment more suitable than in the previous years.

The asset management system in the regions, mounted with PACE II support, provides a means of monitoring and controlling the movement of documents and registration materials.

Results

The impact of the PACE II intervention was apparently limited, but the initial response has been very important to define the voter registration means and methodology. The Timor-Leste team has provided technical and financial resources for the execution of voter registration, choosing CNE and GTAPE direct support, in detriment of the basket fund managed by UNDP, which made impossible the implementation of the results achieved with the technical assistance mission.

The result has been a widening of the registration period that caused a delay on the election date, situation resolved with the Nigeria support, delayed issuance of voter cards and errors in electoral lists which dislocated the voters from their residence places, corrected by hand by the UNDP intervention. One of the conclusions of the report of the Timorese Mission to Support the electoral process in Guinea-Bissau¹⁰ is transcribed below, showing how these positive aspects of UNDP intervention, including the PACE II, and all other forms support have been sidelined:

¹⁰ Missão de Apoio ao Processo Eleitoral da Guiné-Bissau, *O Apoio de Timor-Leste à República da Guiné-Bissau no Retorno à Ordem Constitucional*, ed. Governo da República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2014.

"Without the support of Timor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau could not do anything because many countries have shown their political self interest of various types. (...) Thanks to the efforts of Timor-Leste, which are reflected in the results of voter registration, we managed to carry out the elections (...) Despite the fact that the budget was designed to cover only the voter registration process, the Government of Timor-Leste, through the mission to Timor-Leste in Guinea-Bissau, managed to support general elections by carrying out several activities such as: advertising, candidates' public debate on television, security support for the elections, vehicle donation, IT materials, training, electoral planning in the regions, support for TL-NZ international observation and conducting various types of activities (as was the case in support of Bambaram centro de acolhimento), among others. "

Table 3: Component 3

Support to 2014 General Election Operations

This component of the PACE II is based on an output used to support national actors, namely the CNE, the GTAPE, CSOs, media and other stakeholders in the planning and implementation of electoral operations.

Desired results	Indicators	Targets	Achieved results
Support national actors, including the CNE, the GTAPE, CSOs, media and other stakeholders in the planning and implementation of electoral operations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organisation of voters registration taking into account the new territorial division; 2. Political decision-making and setting of the electoral calendar; 3. Mobilization of resources in time; 4. Fixing the date of elections scheduled for 2013 in accordance with the legal deadlines 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organisation of voter registration taking into account the new territorial division; 2. Political decision making and setting of the electoral calendar; 3. Mobilization of resources to time; 4. Determination of the time of the elections scheduled for 2013 in accordance with the legal deadlines 	Holding in due time free, fair, transparent and credible elections, and their acceptance by all stakeholders
Support for national structures to train election officials in leadership in the planning, and		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Information campaigns and mobilization of voters for their participation in the election; 	Strengthened operational staff capabilities to short-term conduct of the operations linked to PACE in election administration, management and fund

management / evaluation of electoral assistance projects, but also as regards the sustainability of electoral management structures and procedures of the polling stations and verification and transmission of election results		2. The planning, management and implementation of the pre-electoral and electoral operations; 3. Support the counting and publication of the election results according to the legislative framework. Contribute to the efficiently organized, transparent, free and participated elections.	administration, civic education and communication , statistics and computer operations, logistics and assets, etc. with the assistance of international experts and the PMU and its substantial contribution to the diligence of electoral operations. Coordination of the structures put in place worked.
Mobilization of resources in time			Invested resources were used optimally, the management was almost entirely efficient and the methods chosen for the performance have achieved the expected results

Efficiency

The implementation rate of the component 3 is total. Resources invested in the framework of the implementation of this component appear to be used optimally, management was almost entirely efficient and the methods chosen for the performance have achieved the expected results.

National ownership is stronger when it comes to operational measures. At this level, the beneficiaries generally show a commitment to quality and high enthusiasm for the program actions. With the participation of hundreds of civil agents, RECs, CSOs and even populations, a true community spirit is built on this basis that could serve as extension and amplifier of achievements.

For the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections there was a very good coverage of the activities planned by the funds provided for this purpose, which among other things allowed the national bodies to lead the program until achievement of expected results.

Relevance

The objectives were relevant but the results have proved inadequate in relation to national priorities; They were clear and realistic given the available resources; interventions and institutional arrangements were adequate to meet needs; the results framework is suitable for measuring results.

The strong point was the technical and financial support to the implementation of the electoral process, namely electoral logistics. The weaknesses appear to be some flaws in training, resulting in hesitations and small mistakes committed by members of the polling stations, which anyway were able to correct them.

Effectiveness

Progress has been registered in obtaining results, which have contributed to the achievement of project objectives. The coordination structures established in the project worked. The main difficulties encountered were the internal coordination of the CNE and the articulation between the CNE and the regional commissions of elections, because the decisions were very centralized at the CNE (the secretariat, made up of magistrates, accustomed to making decisions without consultation, had no experience of this type of organization there has been a shift away from regional commissions. Those responsible for the implementation of PACE support operations had to get in direct contact with the ground (material distribution plan, delivery of materials to the regional commissions, etc.) This was beyond the PACE functions and forced a permanent presence of the logistics consultant at least for three months.

Support for the CNE was rather factual and more focused on the management of the electoral event than on the strategic capabilities related to management of the electoral field as a whole. Also, this body could not satisfactorily prepare for the 2012 snap election by revising the electoral roll, for example. This failure prompted the suspicion that served as fertile ground for the interruption of April 12, 2012 voting.

Sustainability

National ownership and capacity building at the level of national leaders is insufficient. International support has been so institutionalized that national ownership becomes very problematic.

Yet the Regional Electoral Commissions quickly appropriated themselves of the organization of elections at their level. Since the 2012 elections the chairmen of RECs come together, with the support of the PACE II UPM to assess and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each REC, after which they establish strategies for work on the ground.

Otherwise, the only aspect that seems enhanced and sustainable is the participation of civil society in the monitoring operations on election day, but this effort only had the financial and operational support of UNIOGBIS.

Results

The long-term primary and secondary effects produced by this component are the experience of hundreds of national electoral officials at different levels. The future electoral exercises will not be new to them and the knowledge and confidence gained can be put to good use.

Table 4: Results of Alleged Status - Component 4

Civic Education Programme and political participation within a framework of political dialogue and national reconciliation

Desired results	Indicators	Targets	Achieved results
Assessment and diagnosis of existing capacity, to set up a civic education plan supplemented by information campaigns and voter education. Conduct a lessons learned exercise and a capacity diagnosis in the post-election period	N/A	Ensured planning of a civic education, political dialogue and reconciliation program (focused on promoting the political participation of women and youth) and implementation in coordination with the initiatives and security sector reform programs and the promotion of durable peace	Long-term activities such as a CNE/GTAPE education, dialogue and national reconciliation program to implement during the 2013-14 post-election period, the post-election phase, was not followed due to the departure of most of the members of the PACE II management unit because of the limited financial availability of donors
Refine and implement a National Civic Education Programme anchored on the promotion of Bissau-Guinean citizenship and the basic principles of the Rule of Law and		Partnerships between the CNE and target publics based on complementarity of action to enhance a credible election management and mobilize citizens. Adoption of a methodology based on the principles of	

Democracy		citizenship valorisation and participation - focusing on gender equity / promotion of disadvantaged groups	
-----------	--	--	--

Efficiency

The PACE II impact was extremely important for the electoral process as a whole. It is in the public domain that voter registration was launched through the support of the Timorese Mission to the electoral process with only a hundred kits distributed in the different constituencies and regions in Bissau. This lack of kits and voter registration strategy was likely to be contested by political parties and sometimes the opposition parties threatened to reject the registration results if the number of 700 000 voters was not reached. The prediction by GTAPE of the target population was 800,000.

With many challenges along the way during the course of the registration on the field, it was predictable that on election day all the mistakes were revealed, including the exchange of electoral lists, exchange of constituencies, voter card holders whose names did not appear on the voters list. All this constituted a potential for political parties contesting the election results because many voters would have been denied the opportunity to exercise their right to vote.

These errors of the registration process had already been identified by the PACE II on the eve of election day, so that the PACE II placed with Regional Electoral Commissions its logistics and operations experts to perform error corrections in the field and to create logistical and operational conditions for all voters to vote.

This intervention was necessary because, in an environment with favorable ingredients to political parties' complaints, it was paramount to avoid anything that could jeopardize the elections.

Another important contribution of PACE II during the voter registration period was developing a campaign to inform voters about the locations and movements on the ground of the registration brigades. This contribution also extended to the creation of the slogan for the registration campaign and the creation of a logo for the GTAPE, giving it an image and brand.

Long-term activities such as civic education, dialogue and national reconciliation program and capacity building (including institutional strengthening) of the CNE and GTAPE to implement during the post-election period in 2013-14, the post-election phase, was not followed due to the departure of most of the members of the PACE II management unit because of the limited financial availability of donor funds for basket fund managed by UNDP.

Relevance

Strong points: goals, interventions and short-term results were relevant, clear and realistic considering national priorities and available resources. Weaknesses: Part of the long-term outcomes were not relevant, perhaps because the objective conditions were not met for its implementation.

PACE conceived well planned capacity development activities to strengthen the dynamics of national institutions and enable them to manage the project after the elections. Capacity building could only be done at the immediate and operational level. The shortfall in capacity development is a reality to be taken into account in future election cycles.

Effectiveness

Short-term results have contributed to the achievement of the immediate objectives. The main challenges were the lack of a coherent strategic plan regarding long-term civic education. The electoral challenges makes one forget long-term responsibilities. The shortfall in capacity development has its implications on the ability of national institutions to conduct future elections, including the very low level of the polling station staff, which nevertheless managed to improvise and overcome their shortcomings.

Sustainability

The national ownership and the capacity building rate is limited. Yet the intervened positive changes will continue to be felt in the future but will only be sustainable if programmatic mechanisms are put in place by the development partners.

Impact

The immediate effects were successful. The long term impact is questionable.

Table 5: Component 5

Program for institutional strengthening and sustainable capacity development of electoral management structures, including CNE and GTAPE

Desired results	Indicators	Targets	Achieved results
Strengthening electoral management structures in Guinea-Bissau	Capacity building in the Pro PALOP-TL framework that formed about 22 BRIDGE trainers and trained others in the areas of administration and electoral assistance	Design and establishment of a structured program of institutional capacity building of the CNE (and its components) and GTAPE (and its main local structures)	Not achieved. Yet the success of the rehabilitation and modernization of the physical and technological infrastructure of the CNE and GTAPE created the conditions for the installation of a multipurpose center and training of CNE and GTAPE
Provide the institutions of human capital, infrastructure and technology trigger for sustainable development and effective transfer of skills			
Support for the organization of local elections through the planning and organization of the first such operations in Guinea-Bissau		Direct election of the assemblies and executive bodies in five municipalities corresponding to nine regions	

Efficiency

The workshop and the BRIDGE training for leaders of CNE / GTAPE have reinforced the current members' management capabilities. Also the Pro PALOP-TL project has trained about 22 BRIDGE trainers and promoted capacity building of others in the areas of administration and electoral assistance.

Component 5 of PACE II, which should be implemented during the post-election period in 2013, based on the CNE strategic plan and taking into account a CNE/GTAPE capacity analysis, should provide expertise support to implement a structured plan for sustainable upgrade of the voter registration system highlighting synergies with the civil registry. The project should also support these structures to create a framework for discussion and exchange of experiences for the

organization of local elections and the implementation of a decentralization program focused on the MDGs and human development.

Regarding the organization of local elections, everything remains to be done. Despite the development of the legislative framework for decentralization, it has not been approved and many related operational issues remain unclear. These questions have obvious implications in the feasibility of local elections.

Relevance

Many of the objectives and expected results were relevant, clear and realistic. Most of the planned institutional arrangements were adequate to meet needs.

Strengths – Strengthening of leadership capabilities, support for the rehabilitation, modernization and upgrading of the physical and technological infrastructures of the CNE and GTAPE.

Weaknesses – It was unrealistic to try to conduct a study on the internal reorganization and functioning of CNE and GTAPE structures if these bodies were not conquered to collaborate with PACE II. Also support CNE and GTAPE to create a framework for discussion and exchange of experiences for the organization of local elections and the implementation of a decentralization program has proved impossible due to the specific financial, technical and other pressure. Secondly, and politically, the roadmap for local elections requires a much broader discussion with other actors, which must include the government, parliament, regions and civil society.

Effectiveness

PACE II positive action contributed to progress towards electoral goals, especially the strengthening of leadership capacity. The major challenges were trying to change the mentality and attitude of national actors and stakeholders, whose views always reveal themselves more ambitious than the real capabilities of the country. The main difficulties relate to unrealistic targets defined in strategic plans, including those of PACE II. The coordination structures established in the project did not function under the terms of the design and the adaptation need of the component.

Sustainability

It is doubtful that the positive changes which occurred continue in the future due to the periodic replacement of the CNE secretaries. Complementarily, cooperation and synergy between the development partners will have to be strengthened so that they can become sustainable.

Results

In a general way, PACE II had a significant impact on democratic governance goals. The program allowed CNE and GTAPE to conduct and conclude the process in a credible way under civil peace conditions.

Results and conclusions

As it always happens in all programs, there are differences between the expected results and those obtained. Considering the troubled environment where the PACE II took place - doubts about the quality and the technical nature of the voter registration, coup, financial difficulties, interventions of unexpected actors in the PRODOC, among others - we can easily conclude that the project had, all things considered, a good performance from the perspective of design and strategy.

In terms of the results expected by the PRODOC (holding of snap presidential elections in March 2012 in an efficient and transparent manner, supporting electoral management structures and civil society for the voter registration exercise, civic education long term program, post-electoral program of institutional strengthening and sustainable capacity development) were achieved up to a certain point. The risks were great and they affected the implementation of the program. Mitigation measures have been taken but it was necessary to navigate between critical points that seemed to threaten all activities.

However, all factors considered, the PACE II was both relevant because responding to a problem of good governance and national stability in conformity with a need expressed by the national counterpart, supported by international partners, and efficient because largely based on the strong involvement of national bodies, the use of local logistic means and local staff (voting poll staff, civic education agents, etc.).

Global appreciation

Overall assessment of the efficiency of the intervention	Very satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Deficient
		X		
<p>Conclusion: The analysis highlights the efficiency of the PACE II project regarding the use of human and financial resources. With the establishment of multi-donor basket, activities were almost entirely covered.</p>				
Overall assessment of the effectiveness of the intervention	Very satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Deficient
		X		
<p>Conclusion: Some aspects of the project have not been fully realized, hence the satisfactory assessment of effectiveness.</p> <p>In fact the project was very effective regarding compliance with the timing of operational activities and the organization of elections, which is not the case with regard to the development of national capacities. It is true that significant efforts have been made by the PACE for assistance in expertise and equipment of national institutions, but much remains to be done regarding capacity development, particularly regarding the training of key personnel of these institutions and in achieving the objective of PACE of establishing a strong national electoral administration, able to meet the challenge of future electoral cycles.</p>				
Overall assessment of the sustainability of the intervention	Very satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Deficient
			X	

Conclusion: The national institutions and the Guinea-Bissau government will have to make more efforts to bridge the shortfall in capacity development and the challenge of sustainability of programs and institutions.

The development of strategic plans is a necessary but not sufficient condition if it is not sustained by a mobilization support of financial resources necessary for their implementation. Also in a country where women's voter registration exceeds those of men on the electoral rolls, it seems quite normal to pay particular attention to the issue of gender equity.

The shortfall in training of managers and key personnel of national institutions and the national movement of civil society organizations must be filled in accelerated and continuous training, exchange visits, technical assistance in the short and medium term and to make it possible these national structures must invest more in research of new partnerships, since the closing of the PACE.

The PACE project succeeded to conduct a full electoral process in 2014. PACE also managed to ensure the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections recognized both nationally and internationally as free, transparent, fair and credible.

WEAKNESSES	STRONG POINTS
Work plans were not monitored by a monitoring and evaluation framework that could articulate the technical tasks with issues of political evolution - several hundreds of thousands of unregistered young people were excluded from voting	Generally, short-term objectives, interventions and results were relevant, clear and realistic considering the national priorities and available resources
Training officers of polling stations, "the weak point of the program," according to the UNDP / CNE final narrative and financial report. This weakness resulted in hesitations and small mistakes committed by members of the polling stations	The technical and financial support to the implementation of the electoral process, including electoral logistics
It was not possible to recover the funds granted to the CNE on the eve of the coup	Generally PACE II resources were used efficiently
The failure to mobilize resources for the new voter registration. All PACE II options were put aside in favor of other solutions	PACE II provided a solid basis on options for electoral registration in 2012
The Civic Education and political participation within a framework of national reconciliation and political dialogue Programme - long-term outcomes were irrelevant because the objective conditions were not ripe for execution	Capacity building and training of leaders, support for the rehabilitation, modernization and upgrading of the physical and technological infrastructure of CNE and GTAPE
It was unrealistic to conduct a study on the reorganization and functioning of the structures of the CNE and GTAPE if these bodies were not conquered to work with the PACE II. Also support to CNE and GTAPE to create a framework for discussion and exchange of experiences for the organization of local elections and the implementation of a decentralization program has proved to be impossible because of financial, technical pressure and other type of pressures.	Elections were held with a strong involvement of Guinean national institutions and the international community. It is satisfactory to find out that there were no protests to block the institutional functioning

Despite beneficiary satisfaction about the PACE's contribution to the organization of elections in a highly complex national context punctuated by post-election violence (the military coup being the most dramatic and harmful example) it is clear that the PACE has not been as effective as expected, particularly as regards the development of national capacities and the establishment of a strong and dynamic electoral national administration, able to meet the challenge of future electoral cycles . The project has had to grapple with a situation already underlined by the PRODOC, which presented less positive aspects that should be corrected: the multiplicity of institutional players, resulting in difficulties in coordination and articulation between the various bodies involved in the organization of elections; the practical inability to permanently manage the voters rolls according to the laws, involving the need to start from scratch at each occasion, with all its financial implications in the short and long term; operation in emergency mode for each election deadline, given the moments of crisis in the country, and consequently difficult to appropriate procedural innovations, technology and methodology introduced in several countries (lack of long term planning) . These substantive issues were not resolved.

The questionable sustainability of all achievements and the inability of national authorities to manage the post-project phase constitute a breach of the effectiveness point of view, which can also be extended to other democratic bodies legitimately arising from the elections. This assertion may seem too hard, yet it is confirmed by the hard reality: at the present moment, an institutional crisis which dangerously extends in time leaves the door open to any kind of enormously serious consequences.

However these shortfalls do not question the success of the CAPC, especially as the international partnership in the field of capacity development in Guinea Bissau still offers opportunities for collaboration. It is important that governments and particularly the CNE, CSOs, etc. will not always be waiting for initiatives to be taken by UNDP and that these national institutions take advantage of the knowledge and skills already acquired to initiate strategies for mobilizing resources in order to strengthen their internal capacity.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF PACE II

- 1) Free, fair, transparent and credible elections held in time, based on a consensual and transparent electoral code and accepted by all stakeholders.
- 2) Strengthening the operational capacity of local staff to conduct in the near future operations linked to PACE in election administration, management and fund allocation, civic education and communication, statistics and computer operations, logistics and wealth, etc. with the assistance of international experts and the PMU and its substantial contribution to the diligence of electoral operations.

- 3) Establishing for the second time monitoring brigades or electoral vigilance committees arising from civil society and the importance of their testimony on the proper conduct of elections. This CNE initiative, entrusted to civil society, besides further strengthening the partnership dynamic between the two structures, was a capital contribution in election monitoring and quality control.
- 4) The CSOs, RECs and CNE collaboration in the program execution, training, awareness and civic education, seen from an institutional and formal standpoint, laid the ground for a partnership with a greater involvement of civil society in the management of electoral processes.
- 5) The fund and human resources support of the international community through the establishment of the multi-donor basket and the Project Management Unit established by UNDP were of great importance in fund management and coverage of budgeted activities.
- 6) Excellent planning, and respect for the timetable of operations, made possible the acquisition of the necessary equipment, recruit the necessary human resources, mobilize the needed funds and dispatching them in time so as to cover all the remotest parts of the country.

Omissions must be reported, namely:

Evaluation of gender equality and the advancement of women

The project does not seem to have contributed to the inclusion of the gender dimension or the promotion of women's participation in elections.

Despite widespread legal protection and the fact that they exceed the number of men enrolled in 2014, women continue to be underrepresented in the executive bodies of political parties. Only 8.4 percent of women have occupied the top positions of party candidate lists. Ten women were elected to the National Assembly.

The political participation of women is known: for example, half of the speeches in public meetings during the election campaign was made by women.

Voting participation, disaggregated by gender, is measurable. However, this work is not done systematically. The same applies to the participation of women as members of the polling stations.

The only actions known outside the autonomous initiatives of civil society are those who were fortunately promoted by UN Women with the Plataforma Política das Mulheres and UNIOGBIS with REMPSECAO-GB Rede de Mulheres para a Paz e Segurança da Comunidade Económica para o Desenvolvimento da África Ocidental - Antena da Guine-Bissau.

Adverse effects on the PACE II

It should be noted that this project has been adversely affected by the 2012 coup, which suspended several interventions and made impossible the execution of others.

The consultant responsible for the evaluation also noted that Guinea-Bissau is a small yet very complex country, which is a real challenge for those who contribute to democratic outcomes, hence the difficulties of implementing a program like PACE II.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

ACTIVITY	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES	RECOMMANDATIONS
Planning of the project activities / Execution on time	The schedule of activities has been disrupted by the events but the PACE II has overcome the difficulties	No particular problems	Experience to be renewed for the next electoral cycles
Management and coordination	<p>Good coordination with UNDP facilitated the mobilization of human and financial resources</p> <p>Good coordination between PACE II and others</p> <p>Good coordination between the Project Management Unit established by UNDP, CNE, CP and other structures involved</p>	<p>Presence not sufficient enough in time of international experts to ensure proper capacity building.</p> <p>Lack of communication between CNE and UNDP about spending on the eve of the coup.</p>	<p>Strengthen national expertise to ensure the sustainability of the achievements.</p> <p>Strengthen communication with the CNE, including financial partners, especially as regards financial management.</p>
Regular submission of activity and financial reports	No clear definition of the transmission mechanisms of activity and financial reports to partners.	European Union feels that there were not enough reports.	In the future reach mutual agreement with the partners and outline the transmission mechanisms of reports
Local and international partnership agreements	Multi-donor basket with the participation of several donors: European Union, Peace Building Commission, Angola, Spain, UNDP, ECOWAS, Brazil, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France to finance project	Nothing to report. The capital raised provided perfect operational coverage	The multi-donor basket without specific budget line is an experience to be repeated in the sense that its management is soft and flexible and simplifies financial

	activities		reporting
Document Management	The most sensitive documents (voter rolls, electoral lists, minutes, international observation) are kept at CNE logistics and IT department.	Besides the Prodoc and activity and financial reports, there were no monitoring documents on gender issues, incident reports, visit reports, self-evaluation reports, etc. readable as archives during evaluation.	In the future, create an electronic filing system and filing in hard copy of all project documents, including minutes of meetings, protocols and reports of visits, to facilitate the conduct of evaluations and audits.
Personnel management	Expatriate staff has been well managed by the PMU and the national operational staff managed by the CNE and its decentralized bodies (CERs)	No particular problems in personnel management were reported	Maintain security contract beyond the election period to prevent loss of materials.

Evaluation Criteria and Results

Evaluation criteria	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3	Component 4	Component 5
Efficiency	Financial support for voter cards replacement operations	Very low implementation rate	Optimal implementation rate	Support for pre-electoral and electoral operations in the short term	Support for training of officers, executives and staff of the CNE and GTAPE Ensure the BRIDGE accreditation of trainers of trainers
	Support for elections (1 st round)		Direction, management and implementation of the supervision of operations	National capacity development in the medium term	Support the GTAPE to deepen the analysis of needs and prerequisites for upgrade of the registration system
	Civic Education Plan		Cascade training Setting-up of the civic education campaign	Long-term train and transfer the knowledge and skills of international experts to national partners	Conduct a study on the internal reorganization and functioning of CNE structures and GTAPE
	Support to electoral court dispute		Acquisition of documents, materials and equipment		Support CNE and GTAPE to create a framework for discussion and exchange of experiences in the organization of local elections
Relevance		Arrangements have proved inadequate in relation to the challenges	Relevant objectives and results	Short-term objectives, actions and results clear and realistic, long-term expected results failed	
Effectiveness		PACE II support became dispensable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Realization of project objectives. Coordination structures put in place worked. Achievement of the immediate objectives. Lack of a coherent strategic plan 		
Sustainability		Facilities + equipment facilitation Support for asset management in the regions	Insufficient national ownership and capacity building at the level of national leaders	Reduced rate of national ownership and capacity building	
Impact	Reduced by the military coup	Reduced	Accumulated experience of hundreds of national electoral agents		

The contribution of partners

All actors have contributed to the achievement of results and have each played in their way a critical role in achieving objectives.

- The MAT / GTAPE / INEC regarding the organization and implementation of the national voter registration,
- CNE and its branches (CRE) as regards the supervision of the registration, the organization and management of elections, civic education,
- The Technical Committee and the Steering Committee regarding the diligence of the operations, the search for solutions to various bottlenecks and steering of operations,
- The movement of civil society organizations regarding civic education, training, information and awareness
- The written and spoken media in regard to communication, information and awareness.

The elections were organized with a strong involvement of Guinean national institutions and the international community and it is gratifying to note that there were no objections to block the institutional functions.

Recommendations

• General recommendations

1. More training and appropriation for national actors to strengthen national empowerment and increased capacity for an execution as autonomous as possible of electoral operations.
2. Streamlining and reduction of the institutional actors (CNE-GTAPE could be constituted as a single body) to ensure better coordination and articulation between the various bodies involved in the organization of elections. CNE and GTAPE will especially benefit if a discussion is started on their responsibilities, skills, mandates and forms of articulation.
3. Fighting bad practices (gender, media and lack of information for voters).
4. Lower the cost of elections: the cost per voter reached an average higher than the African average. It is desirable to find ways of contracting election expenses. This report is not the place to bring solutions to this complex problem, but it is strongly recommended that a specific study be made to establish concrete measures that may have constitutional implications (for example, adopt a presidential election system in a single round¹¹, review the constituency distribution,¹² automatic registration in the electoral rolls of all those who reach 18 years, etc.)¹³.
5. UNDP programs should propose conditionalities for beneficiaries to strengthen the sense of ownership and increased partner accountability on outputs.¹⁴

¹¹ This can be done in various ways. The simplest is to adopt the preferential system, as, for example, one used in the presidential election of Sri Lanka. Not only Sri Lankan voters vote for a candidate, but they also have the opportunity (if they wish) to appoint a second and a third, by placing the numbers 1, 2 and 3 next to the names, preferably according to their order. If a candidate receives an absolute majority of numbers one, he is declared elected. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority, only the first two remain in contention and the second and third choice of ballots where the numbers 1 have been eliminated are given to successful applicants as ranked on the ballot paper. The leading candidate after this operation is elected. This process results in a single round the same result as a double ballot, administrative and financial costs two times less. "(*The Design of Electoral Systems. A Manual of International IDEA*, [www.eods.eulibrary / IDEA.Electoral%20Systems%20design%20EN.pdf](http://www.eods.eulibrary/IDEA/Electoral%20Systems%20design%20EN.pdf)).

¹² The least expensive and less complex systems to manage are proportional systems lists, either because there is only one national constituency which does not imply constituency distribution per region, or because the vast plurinominal constituencies coincide with existing regions. (Ibid).

¹³ For further discussion on the financial and administrative implications of electoral systems, consult the project "Administration and Cost of Elections" and its CD-ROM "Encyclopedia of the elections," sponsored by the United Nations, International IDEA and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) <http://www.aceproject.org>.

¹⁴ For example, retain a portion of the funds until the end of the project, ask for cash flow projections demonstrating the need for funds, submit each payment to a report also accompanied by an expenditures

Specific recommendations

- A specific project for the democratic training of all actors of the electoral process: the Training Centre for Democracy (see Annex 10).
- Study based on consultations among CNE / GTAPE / DataBase / Ministério das Finanças / INE / for harmonization and possible merging of all electronic databases. Ideally every citizen aged 18 should be included automatically in constantly updated lists and a card would be issued with a voter number and any other data needed to properly identify the voter.
- Study based on consultations with academia, observers / monitors and judicial organizations, CSOs and political parties regarding the needs for improvement of the legal framework (beyond the suggestions already made, it would be useful to include quota for women while preparing electoral lists and advocate for a law formalizing situation rooms and the right to observe the electoral acts by national entities, including civil society organizations).
- Combatting bad practices:
 - a) There is little or no concern with gender and equality. It is desirable to adopt special legislation for temporary measures such as quotas, to accelerate gender equality in elected positions and public institutions, including the CNE and the Regional Commissions.
 - b) The media covering the events of the election campaign are often offered obsequious gifts or are paid by the candidates. Press freedom in Guinea-Bissau has decreased.¹⁵ The support needs of the media must be considered to avoid this undemocratic practice.
 - c) Conditionalities requiring recipients to adopt a more open attitude and respect for the voters' right of to be informed at all times on the situation point of ante- and post-electoral operations. In addition, the necessary corrections to the existing voter lists should already have been introduced in the databases, otherwise everything may be lost and force a new "de raiz" voter registration next time.
- 5. More training among members of the police and army in all ranks - the training of armed forces in the service of democracy is practiced in many countries with very positive results. In the case of Guinea-Bissau this is a novelty. The context justifies this initiative because the attention to practices of human rights by the military and police are well known and require proactive effort for their training needs.

audit report, payment of the financial contribution subject to gathering of performance indicators, conditionalities and / or previously defined benchmarks.

¹⁵ From 2010 to 2013, Guinea-Bissau held the positions 67 between 178 countries, 75 and 92 among 179 countries, respectively, according to the press freedom index of Reporters Without Borders.

Prospects

Local elections - Despite the ongoing development of the legislative framework for decentralization, the organization of local elections is one of the operational issues that remains to be clarified. One must start working on this issue, otherwise a new long period will be needed before the elections are viable.

In addition, with the establishment of local bodies, communities will become more active requiring services, and demanding responsibilities to locally elected authorities.

Women will have a specific role in this process because they are the majority of the population (52%) and take very much attention to the day-to-day problems that affect their lives and their families (the mother and child health care, schools for children, the food women produce, the living standard, etc.).

Lessons learned

The main lessons learned from the experience and having a generic application are:

- It is doubtful that the positive changes occurred continue in the future, due to the periodic replacement of secretaries of the CNE. At each nomination new members must be invited to training courses and all the experience accumulated by the members who end their terms is lost. Another solution should be found, based on a comparative study of options taking into account the experiences of other countries. A public contest with detailed specifications on the profile of the candidates would be a possible solution.
- The context and its risks, although glimpsed ex ante (eg the report ASSESSING EFFECTS CPD 2008-2012) deserved to be better understood by being subject to mitigation strategies. Indeed, the political-institutional context has experienced significant unrest, including several coups or attempted coups, several snap elections, several transitions and, at this time, an institutional crisis which deprives the country of a government for three weeks. In such an environment, PACE program should incorporate a strategy of risk management and risk mitigation.
- The complementarity, cooperation and synergy among development partners which already exists should however be strengthened so that they can become sustainable.
- There are insufficient efforts for the visibility of financial partners. This remark was made by the European Union and confirmed by members of the CNE. The initial Prodoc PACE I (page 22) determined that "logos of the development partners contributing to the basket fund, as well as the government and the CNE, will appear on the header of mail sent on behalf of the project management unit". This has not been respected. A better way to promote the visibility of each other should be the subject of a reflection. The lesson here is that future initiatives will be more attentive to the particular sensitivities of certain partners, in order to accommodate all interests.
- It is advisable to invest in training among members of the police and the army. Respect for human rights in Guinea-Bissau remains fragile. Guinean human rights organizations have reported incidents of beatings and abductions, intimidation of candidates. Senior executives of the Electoral Commission have been victims of coercion during the electoral process. Guinea Bissau's security forces, including the army, were identified by organizations of human rights to be involved in acts of coercion and violence against political figures.
- The next support to GTAPE should be conditional to the correction and "cleaning" of voter lists and database, which is still possible and very viable; after that, technical assistance to a list updating limited to those who have reached 18 years after the inalterability period of electoral lists. This would be a sure way to lower costs.

Annexes

Annex 1	TDR evaluation	51
Annex 2	List of documents consulted	64
Annex 3	Summary of field visit	67
Annex 4	Evaluation Matrix	69
Annex 5	Results Framework Programme	70
Annex 6	List of persons interviewed	80
Annex 7	Survey to national bodies	82
Annex 8	Informant Survey	84
Annex 9	Powerpoint	89
Annex 10	Training Center for Democracy	99
Annex 11	Calendar of Activities	101

Annex 1

TERMES DE REFERENCE
CONSULTANTS POUR EVALUATION FINALE DE PACE II

Durée	:	27 jours
Date d'affectation	:	le plus tôt possible
Lieu d'affectation	:	Bissau, avec des déplacements à l'intérieur du pays
Langue de travail	:	Français, Anglais, Portugais

1. Contexte et description sommaire du projet

L'évolution du système politique en Guinée-Bissau indique que, depuis l'indépendance, le régime politique a évolué du type autoritaire vers un régime de type démocratique. Ce processus demeure inachevé, parce que caractérisé par une instabilité récurrente, marquée par des violations aux droits de l'homme et l'atteinte à la vie humaine. Les transgressions régulières à l'ordre constitutionnel se sont souvent soldées par la prise du pouvoir par la classe militaire ou avec son appui.

Les premières élections multipartites générales ont eu lieu en 1994. Les élections législatives et le premier tour de l'élection présidentielle ont eu lieu le 3 juillet, tandis que le second tour de la présidentielle a été réalisé un mois plus tard, le 7 août de la même année. Les secondes élections démocratiques eurent lieu le 28 novembre 1999 (législatives et premier tour de la présidentielle), et le 16 janvier 2000 (seconde tour de la présidentielle), à l'issue d'une grave crise politico-militaire qui a éclaté le 7 juin 1998. Compte tenu de la dissolution de l'Assemblée Nationale Populaire, les élections législatives prévues pour le 15 novembre 2002 ont finalement été organisées le 28 mars 2004. Enfin, l'organisation des élections présidentielles du 19 juin 2005 ont marqué la fin de la transition politique et le recours du pays à l'ordre constitutionnel avec le renouvellement des institutions démocratiques. Ces élections générales anticipées ont ouvert la voie à un nouveau cycle électoral. Dans le cadre de ce nouveau cycle électoral, le Gouvernement Bissau-Guinéen a exprimé sa volonté d'un accompagnement financier et technique du PNUD et des autres partenaires à travers la mise en œuvre d'un Projet intitulé «Projet d'Appui aux Elections pour les opérations législatives de 2008 et de l'élection présidentielle de 2010».

Cependant, l'assassinat du Président de la République le Général João Bernardo Vieira et du Chef d'Etat-major en mars 2008 a interrompu le cycle électoral en cours ouvrant ainsi la voie à une période de transition politique. Cette transition a abouti à la tenue des élections présidentielles anticipées le 28 juin 2009 avec l'élection du Président Malam Bacai Sanhá. Son élection a permis au pays de renouer avec la normalisation et la stabilité des institutions démocratiques.

Pour la réalisation de ces élections anticipées, le Gouvernement a sollicité l'appui technique et financier des partenaires au développement traduit par le projet dénommé «Projet d'Appui au Cycle Electoral 2008-2010 (PACE 1)» dont le suivi a été confié au PNUD. L'évaluation finale de ce projet réalisée en décembre 2010 a indiqué que la bonne gestion des opérations électorales avant (établissement des listes électorales, délivrance des cartes d'électeurs et sensibilisation des populations sur les opérations électorales), pendant (organisation des opérations de vote, traitement des résultats) et après (le traitement des recours) a été un élément essentiel de la réussite des élections. Par ailleurs, il faut noter que l'acceptation des résultats par tous les partis a marqué une normalisation de la vie politique de 2010 à 2012 avec une tendance très positive dans les secteurs financier et social et une claire reprise économique.

Toutefois, le décès du Président de la République, Son Excellent M. Malam Bacai Sanhá, a compromis les progrès enregistrés par le pays aussi bien sur le plan politique qu'économique replongé le pays dans une période de transition constitutionnelle. Les discussions entamées par le Président par intérim avec

tous les partis politiques ont permis de fixer la date des élections présidentielles anticipées pour le 18 mars 2012. Malgré les avis contraires de la Commission Nationale Electorale¹ (CNE) d'élargir la période pré-électorale afin d'actualiser la cartographie électorale et de réaliser un nouveau recensement électoral², les acteurs politiques ont maintenu la date proposée pour les élections présidentielles anticipées.

Les efforts des partenaires au développement ont permis de mobiliser un total de 5.5 millions d'US dollars pour finaliser la totale des opérations électorales. Ce panier commun matérialisé par l'élaboration du *Projet d'Appui au Cycle Electoral (PACE II)* qui a permis de financer la phase pré-électorale et le premier tour des élections présidentielles anticipées du 18 mars 2012. Bien que le déroulement des élections présidentielles anticipées a été reconnu crédible, démocratique et transparent par la communauté internationale, les résultats ont été contestés par un groupe de candidats. Les recours introduits auprès de la cour suprême ont été rejetés. Le blocage du scrutin présidentiel a abouti le 12 avril 2012 à un coup d'état orchestré par les forces armées.

Suite au coup d'état, un gouvernement de transition a été mis en place avec l'appui de la CEDEAO qui devait durer un an et conduire le pays vers l'organisation des élections législatives et présidentielles anticipées. Vu les profondes divisions qui existaient au sein de la classe politique nationale et entre les partenaires internationaux sur la reconnaissance du Gouvernement de Transition, ce n'est qu'au premier trimestre 2013 qu'un consensus a été trouvé pour former un gouvernement plus inclusif et consensuel afin de créer les conditions nécessaires pour organiser les élections générales avant la fin de l'année 2013.

Pour atteindre ces objectifs, le Gouvernement a demandé en mai 2013 l'appui des Nations Unies pour financer et organiser les élections générales. Sur la base de cette demande, il a été procédé à une révision du PACE II (2012-2014) en vue de faire le point des appuis apporté aux opérations de mars 2012 et de revoir les composantes du projet. Le montant mobilisé s'élève à 6 792 188 USD et se répartit comme suit :

- Royaume Uni : 387 510 USD
- Turquie : 98 870 USD
- Afrique du Sud : 1 347 229 USD
- Pakistan : 10 000 USD
- Nigeria : 228 043 USD
- Brésil : 106 251 USD
- PBF : 796 080 USD
- PBF/UNWOMEN : 179 653 USD
- Union Européenne : 2 578 019 USD
- Japon : 1 050 533 USD
- Italie : 10 000 USD

Le PACE II révisé a pour objectif d'appuyer les structures de gestion des processus électoraux et les acteurs électoraux pour améliorer le cadre de gouvernance démocratique en Guinée-Bissau et de renforcer les capacités institutionnelles des institutions responsables de la gestion de ces processus. Les objectifs spécifiques du PACE II révisé sont :

¹ La Commission Nationale Electorale a été mise en place depuis 1994. Elle a organisé tout le processus électoral avec l'appui financier des partenaires au développement.

² Il faut noter que le dernier recensement de la population électorale a eu lieu en 2008. Un nouveau recensement aurait permis de mettre à jour la base. —

1. L'appui aux structures de gestion des processus électoraux et acteurs concernés en Guinée-Bissau pour la mise en œuvre des opérations de remise de cartes d'électeurs (2^{ème} voie) et des opérations électorales concernant les élections présidentielles anticipées pour mars 2012⁴;
2. L'appui aux opérations électorales (y compris d'enregistrement des électeurs) dans le cadre des élections générales réalisé en 2014;
3. Education civique de longue durée dans une perspective de participation politique (en particulier des femmes et groupes défavorisés), consolidation de la paix et en articulation de la réforme du secteur de sécurité et défense dans un cadre de gouvernance démocratique;
4. Le renforcement institutionnel et développement des capacités de la Commission Nationale des Elections (CNE), et autres acteurs électoraux dans une perspective de transfert de capacités.

Pour atteindre ces objectifs, les principaux résultats immédiats attendus sont :

1. Les organes de gestion électorale (CNE et GTAPE) et acteurs intervenant dans les processus électoraux organisent les élections présidentielles anticipées pour mars 2012 de façon efficace et transparente permettant l'élection du Président de la République ;
2. L'appui aux structures de gestion des processus électoraux et aux acteurs de la société civile permet l'enregistrement des électeurs et l'organisation efficace, transparente et libre des élections générales de 2014 en ligne avec le cadre légal en vigueur ;
3. Un programme d'éducation civique de longue durée est mis en œuvre permettant d'augmenter la participation des citoyens dans la vie politique, plus spécifiquement, dans les processus électoraux et contribue aux initiatives en cours pour la réconciliation nationale dans le cadre de la gouvernance démocratique et réforme du secteur de sécurité et défense;
4. Un programme postélectoral de renforcement institutionnel et de développement durable des capacités est disponible permettant, sur la base des plans stratégiques disponibles, le transfert des capacités et échanges d'expérience sud-sud, l'appropriation nationale des méthodologies/instruments de gestion électorale et la rationalisation des coûts des opérations électorales pour les cycles électoraux à venir.

Le présent projet a 5 composantes qui sont :

1. **Composante 1** : Appui aux opérations des élections présidentielles anticipées pour mars 2012 : Le budget de cette composante a été exécuté et reflète les dépenses du panier commun avec les opérations pré-électorales et du 1^{er} tour desdites élections.
2. **Composante 2** : Appui aux opérations d'enregistrement des électeurs dans le cadre des élections générales de 2014 : Cette composante a été révisée pour tenir compte de l'option retenue par les autorités nationales en ce qui concerne la modalité du recensement électoral.
3. **Composante 3** : Appui aux opérations des élections générales de 2014 : Elle sera mise à jour pour prendre en compte les coûts additionnels résultant du couplage des élections législatives et présidentielles anticipées.
4. **Composante 4** : Programme d'Education Civique et participation politique dans un cadre de dialogue politique et réconciliation nationale : Cette composante n'a pas été révisée car il s'agit d'un appui sur un long terme.

⁴ Cet objectif lié à l'organisation des élections présidentielles anticipées du 18 mars 2012 n'a pas été reconduit dans le PACE II révisé compte tenu de la réalisation des élections présidentielles anticipées le 18 mars 2012. Dans le nouveau document, 3 objectifs spécifiques ont été retenus.

⁵ Le premier résultat lié aux élections présidentielles anticipées du 18 mars 2012 a été partiellement réalisé avec l'organisation du premier tour desdites élections.

5. **Composante 5: Programme de renforcement institutionnel et de développement durable des capacités des structures de gestion des processus électoraux, notamment la CNE et le GTAPE :** Elle n'a pas été révisée.

2. Justification de l'évaluation

Conformément à la politique d'évaluation du PNUD, à l'accord de financement du projet et compte tenu du budget élevé du projet, le Senior Management a jugé nécessaire de réaliser une évaluation finale à la fin du projet pour mesurer les progrès vers la réalisation des résultats.

3. Portée de l'évaluation et ses principaux objectifs

Cette évaluation finale a pour principal objectif d'évaluer les progrès réalisés sous chaque produit identifiés dans le PACE II. Elle permettra de fournir les éléments nécessaires au PNUD pour répondre à ses obligations d'une part, et d'autre part au gestionnaire du projet de disposer de recommandations stratégiques et pratiques issues des leçons apprises utiles à partager avec toutes les parties prenantes incluant les bailleurs et les bénéficiaires cibles tels que le Gouvernement, la société civile, les institutions nationales et les autres acteurs.

L'évaluation finale couvrira les activités mises en œuvre depuis 2010 sous le PACE II. L'évaluation doit avoir une large portée, en s'étendant non seulement sur les effets du CPD du PNUD de manière générale, mais sur la manière dont le PACE II a contribué à l'atteinte de l'effet UNDAF relatif aux élections. Elle devra également se concentrer sur les aspects non programmatiques des activités tels que le plaidoyer, l'appui-conseil, la communication avec les partenaires et la coordination. La couverture géographique est à l'échelle nationale.

Les objectifs spécifiques de cette mission d'évaluation sont :

- analyser les points forts et les faiblesses de l'exécution du PACE II ;
- analyser l'adéquation entre les objectifs et les résultats escomptés ;
- analyser la pertinence des objectifs et des résultats attendus par rapport au contexte et aux besoins du pays ;
- évaluer la qualité des résultats obtenus et la visibilité du projet ;
- apprécier la durabilité des résultats escomptés (transferts de compétences, renforcement institutionnel, prise en charge des coûts récurrents, etc.) ;
- formuler des recommandations et perspectives aux fins d'améliorer éventuellement les expériences futures en Guinée-Bissau

4. Questions relatives à l'évaluation

L'évaluation devra répondre aux questions fondamentales réparties dans les cinq critères d'évaluation suivants : la pertinence, l'efficacité, l'efficience, la durabilité et l'impact.

4.1 Pertinence des résultats

- Les objectifs et les résultats escomptés sont-ils pertinents par rapport aux priorités nationales ? Sont-ils clairs et réalistes au vu des ressources disponibles ?
- Les interventions sont-elles pertinentes ?
- Les arrangements institutionnels prévus sont-ils adéquats par rapport aux enjeux ?
- Le cadre des résultats (indicateurs) défini est-il pertinent et adapté pour la mesure des résultats ?
- Quels sont les points forts et les faiblesses au niveau de la conception ?

4.2 Efficacité du projet

- Quels progrès vers les résultats ont été réalisés ? Dans quelle mesure les résultats du projet ont contribué à la réalisation des objectifs du projet ? Quels sont les défis majeurs pour chaque composante du projet ?
- Dans quelle mesure les résultats du projet ont contribué à l'Effet CPD concerné ?
- Quels sont les facteurs externes qui ont contribué à la réalisation ou non de l'Effet ?
- Quelles sont les principales difficultés rencontrées et lesquelles en sont les causes ?
- Dans quelle mesure les structures de coordination mises en place dans le projet ont-ils fonctionné ?

4.3 Efficience et gestion du projet

- Quel est le taux d'exécution au niveau global et par composante ? Dans quelle mesure les ressources investies dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de chaque composante ont-elles été utilisées de manière optimale au regard des résultats atteints ?
- Le projet a-t-il été géré de manière efficiente ? Les méthodes choisies pour l'exécution ont-elles permis d'atteindre les résultats attendus ?

4.4 Durabilité, appropriation nationale et renforcement des capacités

- Quel a été le degré d'appropriation de chaque composante par le Gouvernement ?
- A quel point les stratégies et les programmes de Coopération ont-ils été institutionnalisés ?
- Dans quelle mesure les changements positifs intervenus dans le domaine continueront-ils à l'avenir ?
- Dans quelle mesure les capacités nationales au niveau du Gouvernement, de la CNE, de la société civile et des communautés ont-elles été renforcées ? Les capacités développées et/ou renforcées ont-elles produit des effets durables ?
- La complémentarité, la collaboration et la synergie entre les partenaires au développement seront-elles durables ?

4.5 Evaluer l'égalité du genre et la promotion féminine

- Dans quelle mesure le projet a-t-il contribué à la prise en compte de la dimension genre ?
- Dans quelle mesure le projet a contribué à la promotion de la participation des femmes aux élections ? Que devons-nous faire mieux pour les prochains cycles électoraux ?

5. Méthodologie de l'évaluation

La démarche méthodologique de cette évaluation combinera plusieurs méthodes de collecte d'information, à savoir :

- La revue documentaire des données disponibles dans le système de gestion de projet (Atlas), les autres sources internes et externes (document projet, informations financières, rapports, etc.) ;
- Les entretiens avec les informateurs clés ;
- Les interviews semi-structurés et les groupes de discussion avec les parties prenantes et les bénéficiaires ;
- Les visites de terrain (proposer un échantillon de Comités Régionaux d'Élections à visiter) ;
- L'exploitation (compilation, traitement) et l'analyse des données collectées en vue de produire le rapport d'évaluation.

Il faut souligner que certaines méthodes de collecte de données doivent être participatives en vue de maximiser l'implication des bénéficiaires et des parties prenantes. La triangulation des données et des méthodologies doit être utilisée pour contrôler la qualité et la validité interne et externe des informations.

Une méthodologie plus détaillée, un plan de travail ainsi que la matrice d'évaluation (en Annexe 4) seront présentés par l'équipe d'évaluation.

6. Principaux produits attendus

Les produits attendus de cette évaluation sont :

- **Rapport initial d'évaluation (inception report)** : C'est un document qui décrit l'approche méthodologique spécifique à l'évaluation. Il comprend le cadre analytique qui sera utilisé pour collecter les données. Ce document devra aussi indiquer la façon de mesurer le suivi des progrès de la mission d'évaluation, notamment à travers les briefings. Des instruments de collecte de données qui seront utilisés devront être inclus comme annexe de ce document, ainsi qu'une matrice d'évaluation, une liste de potentiels partenaires à rencontrer, les grandes lignes du rapport d'évaluation et un plan détaillé de travail (Produit N°1).
- **Version finale du rapport initial (inception report)** intégrant les feedbacks et les suggestions des commanditaires de l'évaluation, des co-gestionnaires et du groupe de référence (Produit N°2).
- **Une présentation PowerPoint en français** résumant les principaux constats et recommandations pour la réunion avec les parties prenantes (Produit N°3) par le chef d'équipe.
- **Premier draft du rapport d'évaluation en français** : Il doit être élaboré selon le canevas fourni en Annexe 1 (Produit N°4) par le chef d'équipe.
- **Deuxième draft du rapport d'évaluation** : Le consultant international doit intégrer tous les commentaires et suggestions ainsi que les propositions dans le rapport (Produit N°5).
- **Le rapport final d'évaluation en français et en anglais** comprenant le résumé exécutif et les annexes et élaboré selon le canevas fourni en Annexe 1 (Produit N°6). Le chef d'équipe est responsable de la traduction du document en anglais.

7. Composition de l'équipe d'évaluation et compétences requises

L'équipe d'évaluation sera composée d'un consultant international et d'un consultant national. L'expert international devra avoir une solide expertise en gouvernance, notamment sur les questions des élections, en plus d'une expertise en évaluation. Le consultant international sera le chef d'équipe. Son rôle principal sera de superviser l'équipe, d'assurer la qualité des résultats de l'évaluation afin de délivrer dans le temps imparti tous les produits attendus.

Le consultant international sera appuyé par un consultant national. Ce dernier devra posséder une solide expérience dans le domaine de la gouvernance. Il assurera la traduction des messages au cours des rencontres et/ou réunions, facilitera les arrangements administratifs ainsi que les contacts avec le gouvernement et les autres parties prenantes du projet.

Le détail sur les exigences de qualification des consultants est indiqué dans l'Annexe 2.

8. Ethique d'évaluation

Cette évaluation sera réalisée conformément aux principes énoncés dans les directives éthiques pour l'évaluation de l'UNEG⁶, le code de conduite d'UNEG pour l'évaluation dans le système des Nations Unies⁷ et dans la politique d'évaluation du PNUD⁸. Elle doit particulièrement s'attacher à faire ressortir

⁶ <http://uneval.org/search/index.jsp?q=ethical+guidelines>.

⁷ <http://www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeconduct>

⁸ <http://www.undp.org/evaluation/>

les principaux critères de qualité d'une évaluation, notamment l'utilité de l'information fournie, sa crédibilité, ainsi que sa pertinence et sa valeur ajoutée.

9. Arrangement de gestion

Les rôles et les principales responsabilités de l'ensemble des parties impliquées dans le processus d'évaluation sont comme suivants :

A. Commissaire de l'évaluation : Le Senior Management du Bureau pays du PNUD devra : i) fournir au début du processus des conseils clairs aux évaluateurs, ii) fournir un retour d'informations à l'évaluation en préparant une réponse du management et en utilisant les constats de manière appropriée, iii) allouer les fonds et les ressources humaines nécessaires, iv) être responsable et rendre compte de la qualité du processus et des produits de l'évaluation, v) recommander l'acceptation du rapport final du Groupe de référence.

B. Equipe d'évaluation : Le consultant international et le national devront réaliser l'évaluation, soumettre l'approche méthodologique y compris une matrice d'évaluation et un plan de travail avec la responsabilisation de chaque membre de l'équipe, collecter et analyser les informations, élaborer le projet de rapport, la présentation PowerPoint et le rapport final conformément aux termes de référence.

C. Co-gestionnaire de l'évaluation : Le Spécialiste en S&E du Bureau, le chef du cluster Gouvernance et l'équipe du projet devront 1) gérer les dispositions contractuelles, le budget et le personnel impliqué dans l'évaluation, 2) fournir un soutien en matière de coordination au groupe de référence, au commissaire de l'évaluation et à l'équipe d'évaluation, 3) fournir à l'équipe d'évaluation un appui administratif et les données requises, 4) analyser la méthodologie proposée et les rapports d'évaluation afin d'assurer que la version finale réponde aux normes de qualité.

D. Groupe de référence : Les représentants des parties prenantes (bénéficiaires⁹, partenaires de mise en œuvre¹⁰, donateurs, partenaires nationaux) devront fournir une assistance pour la collecte requises, surveiller le progrès de l'évaluation et passer en revue le draft du rapport d'évaluation et le rapport final pour garantir la qualité.

E. Groupe consultatif : Il s'agit du point focal pour l'évaluation au bureau régional à Addis-Ababa (Conseiller Régional en Evaluation). Il sera sollicité selon le besoin pour examiner tous les documents et fournir des conseils sur la qualité de l'évaluation ainsi que fournir des propositions pour améliorer le travail dans son ensemble.

10. Rôle du PNUD

En tant que commissionnaire de cette évaluation, le rôle principal du PNUD est de fournir un support stratégique, financier et administratif. Le PNUD doit conduire l'ensemble de la coordination afin de gérer tout le processus d'évaluation avec l'équipe d'évaluation. Le PNUD devra aussi s'assurer de la dissémination et de l'utilisation des conclusions et des recommandations de l'évaluation afin de renforcer l'apprentissage avec les parties prenantes.

⁹Il s'agit des individus, groupes ou organisations bénéficiant de l'action de développement directement ou non.

¹⁰Ce sont les personnes ou organisations (structures gouvernementales, ONG, etc.) qui collaborent pour l'atteinte des objectifs convenus en commun. En d'autres termes, ce sont les structures qui sont chargées de l'exécution des actions en vue d'atteindre les objectifs arrêtés ensemble.

11. Durée et calendrier pour l'évaluation

Les prestations (jours ouvrables) des consultants seront réparties de la façon suivante :

	Prestations (jours)	Phase de rédaction du rapport (jours)	Total
Consultant international (chef de mission)	11	16	27
Consultant national	11	10	21
Le chronogramme prévisionnel de cette évaluation se présente comme suit :			
Période	Activités et produits clés		

Novembre 2014 •
24 novembre – 5 décembre •
2014

Elaboration et finalisation des Termes de référence
Processus de sélection et de recrutement

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalisation de la conception de la méthodologie d'évaluation
10-16 décembre 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Préparation d'un rapport initial d'évaluation (inception report) (produit 1) Présentation du rapport initial (inception report) au commanditaire de l'évaluation, aux co-gestionnaires et au groupe de référence et consultatif pour observations et suggestions
17-24 décembre 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intégration des observations dans la version finale du rapport initial (produit 2) Conduite de l'évaluation, la collecte des données, visite de terrain Préparation d'une présentation PowerPoint sur les constats et recommandations pour la réunion avec les parties prenantes (produit 3)
25 décembre 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Départ du Consultant International de la Guinée-Bissau Elaborer et soumettre le projet de rapport d'évaluation en français (produit 4)
26 décembre 2014 au 5 janvier 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partager au commanditaire de l'évaluation, aux co-gestionnaires et au groupe de référence et consultatif pour leurs commentaires Produire le deuxième draft du rapport prenant en compte les commentaires (produit 5)
12-14 janvier 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partager avec le senior management et le groupe consultatif pour revue
26-29 janvier 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Finalisation du rapport d'évaluation après la revue du groupe consultatif et soumission du rapport final en français et en anglais (produit 6) Communication : Co-gestionnaire de l'évaluation pour traduire le rapport final en portugais, l'éditer et le diffuser. Le rapport sera publié en version imprimé et électronique, et largement diffusé en Guinée-Bissau. Le public pourra avoir accès au rapport sur le site de l'ERC¹¹.
Février-mars 2015	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Réponse de la Direction (Management Response) : Le Senior Management du PNUD Guinée-Bissau préparera une réponse de la Direction au rapport final de cette évaluation. L'unité d'Appui à la Gestion du Programme (PMSU) sera chargée du suivi de la mise en œuvre des actions et des recommandations, par l'intermédiaire du Centre des évaluations en ligne du PNUD (ERC).</u>

¹¹ UNDP Evaluation Resource Centre <http://www.erc.undp.org>

12. Coût estimatif

Le budget total couvrant les coûts associés à cette évaluation est USD 40,000 dont USD 30,000 pour le consultant international. Le financement de cette mission sera pris en charge par le budget du projet PACE II.

13. Présentation et contenu de l'offre

Pour le poste de consultant international, l'offre devra comprendre :

- un curriculum vitae (CV) dûment signés par les postulants
- formulaire P11 rempli et signés par les postulants
- une proposition technique indiquant la compréhension des TDR, la méthodologie d'évaluation choisie, la matrice d'évaluation, un plan de travail détaillé et une ébauche des questionnaires
- une offre financière

Toutes les offres devraient être transmises à travers le site du PNUD (Jobs.undp.org) avant le 05 décembre 2014. Les dossiers incomplets seront exclus.

Pour le poste de consultant national, l'offre doit être sous pli fermé et déposé au Bureau du PNUD à la date fixée dans l'appel à candidature. L'enveloppe ne comportera aucune mention en dehors de celles qui suivent :

«Offre pour Evaluation du Projet d'Appui au Cycle Electoral 2012-2014 (PACE II)»,
«A n'ouvrir qu'en séance»

A l'intérieur de chaque pli devront figurer dans deux enveloppes séparées, une offre technique et une offre financière.

L'offre technique comprendra obligatoirement :

- le curriculum vitae (CV) dûment signé par des postulants
- formulaire P11 rempli et dûment signé

L'offre financière sera libellé en hors taxe.

Critère pour l'évaluation des propositions : La sélection sera faite sur la base du cursus scolaire et des expériences dans le domaine concerné. La proposition technique qui aura obtenu au moins 70 points sera considérée pour l'analyse financière.

Les candidatures féminines et les minorités sociales sont encouragées à postuler.

13. Annexes

Annexe 1 : Modèle de rapport d'évaluation¹²

1. Titre et pages de démarrage
 - Nom de l'intervention d'évaluation
 - Calendrier de l'évaluation et date du rapport
 - Pays de l'intervention d'évaluation
 - Noms et organisation des évaluateurs
 - Noms de l'organisation initiant l'évaluation
 - Remerciements
2. Table des matières
 - Inclure les encadrés, les schémas, tableaux et annexes avec les références des pages
3. Liste des acronymes et abréviations
4. Résumé d'exécution (4 pages au maximum) y compris les principales conclusions et recommandations en version française et anglaise
5. Introduction
6. Description de l'intervention
7. Objectifs et Etendue de l'évaluation
8. Approche méthodologique d'évaluation
9. Analyse des données
10. Résultats et conclusions
 - Résultats et conclusions globaux en répondant aux questions ou critères d'évaluation
 - Résultats et conclusions par composante
 - Conclusion générale
11. Recommandations
 - Recommandations d'ordre général
 - Recommandations d'ordre spécifique
 - Perspectives
12. Leçons apprises
 - Quelles sont les principales leçons pouvant être tirées de l'expérience et pouvant avoir une application générique
 - Quelles sont les meilleurs et plus mauvaises pratiques en terme de conception, d'engagement, de suivi et évaluation des produits, activités et partenariats autour de l'effet.
13. Annexes du rapport
 - TDR de l'évaluation
 - Matrice d'évaluation
 - Liste des personnes rencontrées ou groupes interviewés ou consultés et des sites visités
 - Résumé des visites de terrain
 - Liste des documents exploités
 - Cadre des résultats du programme
 - Tableaux de résumé des déductions

¹² Pour plus de détails consulter le site web du guide du PNUD: <http://www.undp.org/oe/handbook>

Annexe 2 : Qualification des membres de l'équipe d'évaluation

Qualification du consultant international

- Master (BAC+5 ans) en sciences politiques, en droit ou tout autre domaine équivalent
- Au moins 10 ans d'expériences dans le domaine de la gestion et de la conduite des évaluations des programmes et projets, notamment des projets d'appui aux processus électoraux/politiques
- Une vaste expérience dans l'utilisation de méthodologies innovatrices de collecte de données
- Expérience en gestion de projet et de programme dans un contexte de développement spécifiquement en Gouvernance (processus électoraux)
- Maîtrise des thèmes transversaux tels que la prise en compte du genre dans les programmes et projets
- Excellente communication orale et écrite en français et en anglais. La connaissance du portugais est un atout
- Excellentes capacités de facilitation avec l'utilisation de certaines méthodes participatives

Qualification du consultant national

- Master (BAC+5 ans) en sciences politiques, sociologie, droit ou tout autre domaine équivalent
- Au moins 5 ans d'expérience dans la gestion et en évaluation des projets de développement et de projets électoraux de préférence
- Connaissance du contexte politique bissau-guinéen en matière des élections
- Une bonne connaissance et une expérience approuvée de travail sur les questions des élections
- Excellente connaissance dans la conduite des approches participatives de collecte de données
- Bonne maîtrise du Portugais est requise. La maîtrise du français ou une autre langue qui permet une excellente communication avec le consultant international serait un atout

Annexe 3 : Documentation de référence (Pas exhaustif)

- Document du Programme Pays 2008-2012
- CPAP 2008-2012
- Extension du Programme Pays 2013-2014
- DENARP II
- Document d'UNDAF 2008-2012
- Document UNDAF+ 2010
- Document de projet (PACE II)
- Rapport d'évaluation finale de PACE I
- Rapports d'exécution du projet
- ROAR (2012, 2013)
- Rapports Combinés des Dépenses (CDR)

Annexe 4 : Matrice d'évaluation

Evaluative Criteria Questions

Indicators

Sources

Methodology

E			
E			
Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?			

Annexe 5 : Code de conduite

Evaluators/Consultants:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System:

Name of Consultant:

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant):

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at _____ (Place) on _____
(Date)

Signature: _____

Annex 2

List of documents consulted

- Aboubakiry KOULIBALY, Spécialiste en Suivi et Evaluation, Consultant International, Orlando Mendes Viegas, Consultant National, EVALUATION FINALE DU PROJET D'APPUI AU CYCLE ELECTORAL (PACE) 2008/2010, 06 au 31 décembre 2010
- Banque Africaine de Développement, *Guinee-Bissau document de stratégie pays 2015-2019*
- Carlitos Djedjo e Frankling Vieira, *Relatório final das eleições gerais 2014*, Julho de 2014
- Carlitos Djedjo e Frankling Vieira, *Relatório. Assistência jurídica à CNE*, Maio e Julho de 2014
- CNE, *Apresentação da CNE* (Powerpoint)
- CNE/UNDP, Eleições gerais 2014, *Formação e educação cívica (implementação)* (Powerpoint)
- GOSCE, Grupo das Organizações da Sociedade Civil para as Eleições, *Declaração*, 13 Abril 2014
- José Malam Jassi, Primeiro relatório intermédio, Eleições gerais 2014, Junho de 2014
- José Malam Jassi, Segundo relatório intermédio, Eleições gerais 2014, Agosto de 2014
- Macky Tall, *Rapports intérimaires*, Janeiro a Agosto de 2014
- Maria Lectícia Silva, *Relatório de missão*, Maio de 2014
- Miguel de Barros e Odete Costa Semedo, *A Participação das Mulheres na Política e na Tomada de Decisão na Guiné-Bissau - Da consciência, percepção à prática política*, ed. UNIOGBIS, 2013
- Missão de Apoio ao Processo Eleitoral da Guiné-Bissau, *O Apoio de Timor-Leste à República da Guiné-Bissau no Retorno à Ordem Constitucional*, ed. Governo da República Democrática de Timor-Leste, 2014
- Missão de Observação Eleitoral da União Europeia à Guiné-Bissau, *Relatório final Eleições Presidenciais e Legislativas*, 13 Abril 2014
- Oliver Vick, *Promoting local election management as part of an electoral cycle approach 2*, ed. UNDP
- UNDP et CNE de Guinée-Bissau, *Projet d'appui aux élections présidentielles et législatives 2014, Rapport final, mars 2014-mai 2015, préparé pour le gouvernement des donateurs*
- UNDP, Guiné-Bissau, Eleições gerais 2014, Projecto PACE, *Resumo de actividade Logístico* (Powerpoint)
- UNDP, Guiné-Bissau, Eleições gerais 2014, Projecto PACE, *Summary of activities implemented and next steps* (Powerpoint)
- UNDP-PACE, Unidade de Gestão do Projecto, *Relatório final, Operações Eleitorais, Eleições Gerais 2014*
- UNDP, ProDoc
- Sabino Santos Lopes, *Relatório de consultoria em matéria de comunicação na Comissão Nacional de Eleições*, Bissau, Fevereiro a Junho de 2014

Terry Pinto, *Assistance to the 2014 general elections in Guinea-Bissau, Final report, period of the assignment: February 2014 – May 2014*

UNDP electoral support activities Weekly reports, 18-22 November 2013 to 4-11 April 2014

Internet <http://www.cne-guinebissau.org/ncorpo.php?id=7>

Annex 3

• Field Visit Summary

Our field trip to the Mansoa Regional Committee of Elections' facilities took place on August 27. The consultant was accompanied by Malam Jassi, focal point of PACE II project and responsible to the UNDP Electoral Affairs.

Due to the absence of the chairman, we were received by the secretary of the State Committee that led us to a locked room in the Committee's facilities where was empillées hundreds of ballot boxes and some electoral papers. It smelled strongly of mold and the roof showed rainwater infiltration signals. The plan is to send these materials to Gabu, where you can store them in suitable facilities.

Then we went to see the house that was for the Regional Commission of Elections which nevertheless has been claimed as a residence of the leader of the State Committee of Mansoa. Two of the rooms were still occupied with election materials, including a printing machine and a computer, stowed so as not to receive moisture. The plan is to bring these materials to the CNE of Bissau, which nevertheless has no space to receive them because there is no warehouse to keep them, unless they are arranged on the plate cement in the building of the CNE.

Annex 4

Evaluation Matrix

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The design of the project addressed key issues which had emanated from the consultations and the conclusions of the Needs Assessment Mission which was deployed prior to its application. The PACE II conferred a particular and important emphasis on voter education planning and funding. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subsequent to the signing of the ProDoc, the project was severely unsettled by the coup d'état in 2012. This hindered the establishment of the project substantially. The work plan went through a revision and therefore procurement could not commence until the stakeholders had formally approved it. There was particular focus on the need to enhance the IT capacity of the GTAPE and to help develop IT solutions with special regards to the electoral registration. The results were not satisfactory. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews ProDoc Consultations with PACE II consultants Consultants' reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Questionnaires Surveys Desk review Open-ended interviews
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The programme has delivered benefits that would not have been possible without the funding and other support provided by UNDP and the development partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthened institutional capacity of beneficiary organizations. Knowledge transfer as a result of training of electoral agents and officials. An increasing number of Bissau-Guineans have been empowered to make informed decisions on the process. The PACE II supported the GTAPE and CNE, helped them to ensure the transparency of the voter register and monitoring of election events and voter registration and helped to follow guidelines to strengthen their role. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews ProDoc Consultations with PACE II consultants and UE consultants Consultants' reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Questionnaires Surveys Desk review Open-ended interviews
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?			

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The contribution of donors followed the UNDP partnership approach, with mobilized resources combined in a basket fund with contributions. Financial management was in accordance with UNDP guidelines and in conformity to conditionalities of development partners. Of the total results that were specified in the work plan, approximately 50 per cent were achieved, (activities carried out successfully), 26,6 per cent partially achieved (activities that were carried out but did not reach their targets) and 23,3 per cent not achieved (activities either cancelled or the activity was not successful). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most of the time technical assistance was adequate and facilitated the implementation and completion of activities to achieve stated results. Many of the Indicators were appropriate; a few were vague or ambitious. There was adequate internal control from the early stages of implementation. The nature of the procurement process ensured appropriate and quality of inputs. Lead time for procurement and implementation was sometimes inadequate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews ProDoc Consultations with PACE II consultants <p>Consultants' reports</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Questionnaires Surveys Desk review Open-ended interviews
<p>Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?</p>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The influence of policy support measures on sustainability is pertinent. The choice of technology is important. In the main, the technological updates have been successful in their implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GTAPE/CNE have been recipients of support for many years and capacity has been built but not enough to be autonomous. It is important that policy support measures taken under an ownership perspective are adhered to in order to ensure sustainability. It is unsure that technological updates provide for long term sustainability. The process in 2012 has illustrated that elections can be prone to emerging political violence and in this case a military coup d'etat. Mediation, training and risk assessments were not carried out throughout the new electoral cycle started after the 2014 elections. Although many acknowledge that Guinea-Bissau was heading in the right direction to sustain democracy, the present unstable situation makes everyone fearful that political oversight and the tendency towards conflict may well become a norm. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Questionnaires Surveys Desk review <p>Open-ended interviews</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Questionnaires Surveys Desk review Open-ended interviews

Annex 5

Programme Results Framework

Indicator 1: Number of cards issued for elections during the 2012-2013 election cycle and % of voters registered for the elections scheduled for the 2012-2013 election cycle				
Indicator 2: Voter turnout in elections scheduled for the 2012-2013 election cycle				
Indicator 3: Evaluation of the electoral process by reports of election observation missions for the electoral cycle 2012-2013				
Project title and number: Project for the 2012-2014 election cycle in Guinea-Bissau (PACE II) / GNB 00,064,906 / GNB 00064906				
Expected Results	Targets	Preliminary activities	Responsible Entities	Previewed Resources
The electoral management bodies (CNE/ GTAPE) and actors in electoral process organize snap presidential elections in March 2012 in an efficient and transparent way for the election of the President of the Republic	COMPONENT 1: Operations Support snap presidential elections for March 2012			
	TARGET 2012:			
	(1) The handing of presidential elections and voters cards anticipées of March 18, 2012 are ensured and monitored effectively allowing voters to exercise their right to vote in the whole country. (2) communication with the teams on the ground and followed the team GTAPE operations coordination of delivery of new voters cards is assured. (3) the second week of February 2012 at the latest (1) 3 vehicles (pick-up) are acquired and in the field; (2) Field teams are equipped with means of transport (vehicles & canoes) for the conduct of field operations as planned.	1. Support for voters card distribution operation (replacement card); 2. Support to snap presidential election Operations in 2012.	UNDP/CNE/GTAPE	1.1. 652,200US\$ 2.1. 3,015,926 US\$
			COMPONENT 1 TOTAL	3,668,126 US\$

<p>Support for electoral process management structures and actors of civil society allows the efficient, transparent and free organization of general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013 in line with the current legal framework, in accordance with their legal mandate and the electoral standards contained in international treaties ratified by the State of Guinea-Bissau in the framework of the United Nations and non-conventional standards adopted within the African Union</p>	<p>COMPOSANTE 2 : Operations Support for the Voter Registration within the framework of the general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013</p>		
<p>Indicators : (1) General Elections are organized efficiently and on time granted by national political actors in the political transition timetable; (2) The elections are considered free, transparent and fair by MOE and national political actors. COMPONENT 2: Support for voter registration operations in the context of general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013.</p>	<p>TARGET 2013:</p> <p>(1) The revision of electoral mapping is concluded and takes into account local constituencies.</p> <p>(2) Equipment Specifications and developed procurement plan and procurement of equipment for the electoral registration carried</p>	<p>1. Appui technique, coordination et gestion du processus d'enregistrement des électeurs ;</p> <p>2. Supervision of electoral registration operations by CNE;</p>	<p>UNDP/GTAPE</p> <p>1.1. 2,622,868 US\$</p> <p>1.1. 404,142 US\$</p>

	<p>out on time in the electoral calendar.</p> <p>(3) A new registration of voters is made more securely and allows recording at least 700,000 voters on the national territory.</p> <p>(4) electoral registration operations in the efficiently organized national territory and takes into account the findings of the feasibility study of the electoral registration in Guinea-Bissau.</p> <p>(5) Updating and display of voter lists is provided within the deadline set by the electoral calendar.</p> <p>Indicators: (1) topographic maps of electoral mapping finalized and available; (2) at least 700,000 voter cards distributed throughout the national territory; (3) at least 700,000 potential voters registered in the schedule; (4) electoral lists updated and available within the periods prescribed by the electoral calendar; (5) Voter information pieces are in the public radios, private, community and local. Baselines: Since 2008, the MAT / GATPE does not update the voters list. The last electoral registration of 2008 and used as the target population registration data conducted in 1991. A new population-census was conducted in 2009 and fixed the population of Guinea-Bissau 1.5 Million inhabitants (new target) . The last electoral registration has fixed the electorate by about 600,000 voters. Based on new population-census, about 200,000 additional voters must be registered. 1. Technical Support, coordination and management of the voter registration</p>	<p>3. Computerization of voter data - processing and display of voter lists;</p> <p>4. Voter Registration Operations in the country;</p> <p>5. Information campaign, awareness and mobilization of voters ;</p> <p>6. Acquisition / rental of equipment and logistics.</p>		<p>1.1. 305,707 US\$</p> <p>1.1. 2,006,664 US\$</p> <p>5.1. 2,703,413 US\$</p> <p>6.1. 964,480 US\$</p>
--	---	--	--	---

process;			
COMPONENT 2 TOTAL			8,603,132 US\$
COMPONENT 3: Operations Support the general elections scheduled for the last quarter of 2013			
<p>TARGET 2013:</p> <p>(1) The establishment of the structures and the CNE units is provided for starting operations on schedule by the electoral calendar and to strengthen the coordination, management and supervision of the electoral process.</p> <p>(2) The establishment of the ERC and its staff is guaranteed to start field operations on schedule by the electoral calendar.</p> <p>(3) The development and implementation of logistics ensures the production, transport and effective electoral materials on time to / from the polling stations.</p> <p>(4) The development and implementation of the procurement plan can finalize the specifications and develop the electoral materials on time by the electoral calendar.</p> <p>(5) The training of electoral agents, civil society and representatives of political parties before</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Technical and financial support for the establishment of CNE structures and units to strengthen the coordination, management and supervision of the electoral process; 2. Technical and financial support for the implementation of the CREs and their staff for field operations; 3. Financial support and training to political party representatives at the CNE and CRE; 4. Tabulation, treatment and announcement of election results; 5. Acquisition and rental of logistics 6. Acquisition of various electoral materials, kits, and electoral documents; 7. Civic education campaign and voter mobilization; 	<p>UNDP/CNE/MAI</p>	<p>1.1. 948,441 US\$</p> <p>2.1. 637,938 US\$</p> <p>1.1 928,038 US\$</p> <p>1.1. 24,586 US\$</p>

	<p>slippage in the schedule. Resource mobilization is still beyond the needs and additional effort on the part of the partners is required. 1. Technical and financial support for the establishment of structures and units of the CNE to strengthen the coordination, management and supervision of the electoral process;</p> <p>2. Technical and financial support for the implementation of the CREs and its staff for field operations;</p> <p>3. Financial support and training to political party representatives at the CNE and CRE;</p> <p>4. Tab, treatment and announcement of election results;</p> <p>5. Acquisition and rental of logistics</p> <p>6. Acquisition of various electoral materials, kits, and electoral documents;</p> <p>7. Campaign civic education and voter mobilization;</p> <p>8. Training of polling officers; Indicators: (1) operation, logistics and procurement plan for general elections scheduled for 2013 are available; (2) Training Guides for polling station officers and training of Electoral Civic Education agents are available; (3) positive evaluation of training modules; (4) Number of contracts with media and civic groups; (5) MOE Reports make a positive assessment of the organization of general</p>			
--	---	--	--	--

	<p>elections scheduled for 2013 in Guinea-Bissau. Baselines: After the military coup of April 12, 2012 which interrupted the presidential elections on March 12, 2012 preventing the election of a president democratically, the country has started again a political transition. This period must be completed with free and fair elections before the end of 2013. Political Agreement and taking into account the end of the mandate of the CNE, a new executive secretariat of the CNE has been elected and has not much experience in the electoral field. Upgrade training in electoral administration were designed and issued to members of the secretariat. The election timetable is very tight and there is a risk of slippage in the schedule. Resource mobilization is still beyond the needs and additional effort on the part of the partners is required.</p>			
COMPONENT 3 TOTAL				7,036,170 US\$
A civic education long term program is implemented to increase citizen participation in politics, more specifically, in the electoral process and contributing to ongoing initiatives for national reconciliation within the framework of democratic	COMPONENT 4: Civic Education Programme and political participation within a framework of political dialogue and national reconciliation			
	<p>TARGET 2013-2014: (1) Ensured planning of a civic education, political dialogue and national reconciliation program (focused on promoting the political participation of women and youth) and implemented in coordination with the initiatives and security sector reform programs and promotion of sustainable peace</p> <p>Indicators: to supplement through a revision of the project document, when planning and implementing this component. Baselines: to be completed through a revision of the project document, when planning and implementing this component.</p>	<p>1. Capabilities diagnostic based on participatory and inclusive lessons learned exercises;</p> <p>2. Training and building capacity program;</p> <p>3. National Civic Education Program - training and capacity building;</p> <p>4. Teaching materials, guides and training manuals;</p> <p>5. National Civic Education Programme - diffusion and sensitization by UNDP</p>	UNDP/CNE/CSO	<p>1.1. 1.2. 3,985 US\$</p> <p>2.1. 18,500 US\$</p> <p>1.1. 51,290 US\$</p> <p>1.1. 141,190 US\$</p>

governance and reform of the security and defense sector. Indicators: to supplement through a revision of the project document, when planning and implementing this component.				5.1. 409,980 US\$
COMPONENT 4 TOTAL				624,945 US\$
A long-term program of institutional strengthening and sustainable building capacity is implemented and covers the 2012-14 election cycles, allowing the transfer of skills and exchange of South-South experience, national ownership methodologies / instruments for election management and rationalization of costs of the electoral process for future election cycles, based on the	COMPONENT 5: Institutional Strengthening Program and sustainable building capacity development of electoral processes' management structures, namely the CNE and GTAPE			
	<p>TARGET 2013:</p> <p>1. Recruitment and implementation of PACE II Management Unit to ensure the TA to Electoral Management Bodies and election stakeholders (November 2013).</p> <p>TARGET 2014:</p> <p>1. Ensured acquisition and rehabilitation of equipment, materials and facilities identified by the upgrade program and institutional empowerment of electoral processes' management structures (CNE / GTAPE).</p> <p>2. Training and exchange missions experiences and capacity building between ensured pairs. Study on the improvement of internal procedures available</p>	<p>1. Recruitment and setting up of the PMU and specific expertise to support the EMB in organizing the electoral process in the 2012-14 election cycle;</p> <p>2. Empowerment and development of EMB staff capabilities;</p> <p>3. Development and institutional reform of the EMB;</p>	UNDP/CNE/GTAPE	<p>1.1. 900,000 US\$</p> <p>2.1. 130,000 US\$</p>

<p>strategic and operational plans available.</p> <p>Indicators: (1) A Management Unit recruited under the 2013 general elections builds up the capacities of EMB for strengthening the voter registration system and improve organizational procedures of the electoral process; (2) to complete through a revision of the project document, when planning and implementing the post-election phase of this component.</p>	<p>3. Training and exchange missions experiences and capacity building between ensured pairs. Internal procedures implemented</p> <p>4. Technical support and advice provided in the post-election period, particularly in the areas of biometric registration, leadership and conflict management in the electoral administration and the election administration. Indicators: (1) CTP, Expert in Voter Registration, Electoral Logistics Expert, Expert in Civic Education, Finance Expert and other requested staff are on site within the period laid down in the operational plan; (2) operational, logistics and transportation maps, and election material assistance are available; (3) Training Program of election officials and civic education are available and implemented; (4) Experts activity reports, situation and progress report, as well as the final report of CTP available. Baseline: UNDP sustainable support to EMB, CNE and GTAPE in particular, through the Pro PALOP-TL. The evaluation of the weaknesses of the system and organization / administration process was conducted repeatedly and capacity building activities of these bodies are done during election cycles. These activities have been suspended since the military coup of 12 April 2012. The Executive Secretariat of the CNE has been appointed and installed. Its members need capacity building in the electoral field and this is been done in the Pro PALOP-TL.</p>	<p>4. EMB's institutional and infrastructural strengthening</p>		<p>3.1. 80,000 US\$</p> <p>1.1. 290,000 US\$</p>
COMPONENT 5 TOTAL				1,400,000 US\$
UNDP GMS (7% of the total budget)				1,493,266 US\$
TOTAL				22,825,639 US\$

Annex 6

CONTACT LIST

Entity	Names	Contact
AFRICAN UNION	Ovídio Pequeno Representative	686 96 15 Bairro da Penha
	Prosper	5585496
European Union	Vítor Madeira dos Santos Ambassador chief of the Delegation	viktor.madeira.santos@eeas.europa.eu
	Victor Puerta – IT Consultant to the President	542 59 08 vpuerta10@hotmail.com
	Piero Valabrega Encarregado de Programas Sector Boa Governação, Economia e Integração Regional	Delegação da União Europeia junto da República da Guiné- Bissau Bairro da Penha, Bissau Telemóveis: (245) 538 51 12 e (245) 601 50 65 Telefone: (245) 325 14 69
	Sonia Moreno UGP Coordinator UE-PAANE – Non-State Actors Support Programme	6623019 www.uepaane.org
	António Soares Lopes (Tony Tcheka) Perito de Médias	Rua 10 – Dr. Severino Gomes de Pina (Antigo Prédio da Função Pública) 6195418 – 5536296 corubal@hotmail.com
CNE	Augusto Mendes – Presidente	663 23 37 augustomendes62@gmail.com cne.guinebissau1@hotmail.com
	Pedro Sambu – Secretário Executivo Operational plan, Finance, Logistics	6856818 ou 5804419
	Idrissa Djaló – Executive Secretary Civic Education	720 36 05
	António Iaia – Admn. and Finance Dept	720 42 51
	Kátia A. Lopes – Deputy Executive Secretary Media and Legal Affairs CNE Spokesperson	645 57 34 736 01 72 lopeskatiamarca@gmail.com cne.guinebissau@hotmail.com
	Sumaila Sané – Chief of President’s Cabinet Civic Education and Training	633 12 99 msumailasani@gmail.com
	Adulai Baldé, da CRE de Gabu Nelson Meneses, da CRE de Bafatá Fernando Gones, da CRE de Cacheu Fernando Bacurim, CRE de Bissau	5501650 6633118 6636633 5754670, 6622473
	Júlio Cá – Media and Legal Affairs	546 18 90
	Diamantino Barai – Civic Education and Training	diamantinogomesbarai@uahoo.com
	Etchen Sambu – Consultant to the President	etchens@yahoo.com
GTAPE	Cristiano Na Betam Ex-Director geral	6746698 – 5478533

	Alain Sanka <i>Director geral</i>	6666851 – 5766161 – 5908690, Av. Unidade Africana disanka.66@gmail.com
	Engº Iaia Director dos Serviços de Informática do Ministério das Finanças	5545123 - 6945123
UNDP	Gabriel Labão Dava – <i>Deputy Resident Representative</i>	652 59 32 gabriel.dava@undp.org
	Jose Malam Jassi Programme Analyst	Rua Rui Djassi , B.P. 179 Bissau Guiné - Bissau jose.m.jassi@undp.org Phone: +245 660 75 80/+ 245 580 44 20
CSO	Tinguena Miguel de Barros	557 88 00 6917716 Bairro de Belém, Zona de Las Palmeiras
	Nantinyan Lázaro Barbosa <i>Secretário executivo</i>	6801165 – 5379334 ongnantinyan@yahoo.com.br lbarbosa65@yahoo.com.br
	Associação das Mulheres Juristas Helena Neves	6645868
UNIOGBIS	Martinho Chachiuia <i>Chief Political Affairs Section</i>	600 30 17 chachiuia@un.org
SEMLEX BISSAU S.A.	João Paulo Mendes <i>Deputy Manager</i>	664 44 72 josemlex@hotmail.com
	Nkengmamekontchou Georges <i>Manager</i>	641 00 84 nkeng13@yahoo.fr
Simão Té	Assistente jurídico da Comissão Especializada Permanente para a Mulher e Criança da Assembleia Nacional Popular	6028956 datchy72@yahoo.com.br
Sabino Santos	Jornalista do <i>Última Hora</i> , consultor nacional contratado pelo PACE II	6961302 sabinosantos@hotmail.com
João de Barros	Jornalista	5272727 joaodebarros@hotmail.com

Annex 7

Inquiry to national bodies

1. In what measure did the donors' support contributed to the legitimacy and transparence of the voter registration and the electoral processes?

Not at all	A little	Significantly	Absolutely	Don't know

2. How would you describe internal coordination of operations, including the one of PNUD/PACE II and others supporters?

Bad	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

3. In what measure there were improvements in the election process as compared with previous elections?

Not at all	A little	Significantly	Absolutely	Don't know

4. Is the basket fund structure a good model to use in future donor-supported elections?

Agree	Disagree	Maybe	Don't know	

5. How do you classify PACE II participation in general?

Bad	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

6. Was the basket fund an useful financial instrumento to coordinate the donors' support?

Agree	Disagree	Maybe	Don't know	

7. The basket fund system was a process where the money was spent more efficcintly because se funds were put together

Agree	Disagree	Maybe	Don't know	

8. How do you evaluate CNE and GETAP ability to conduct a futuro electoral process without international support?

Bad/Non existant	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

9. In what measure PACE II-PNUD-Basket fund implemented (instead of simply advising) CNE and GETAP tasks?

Not at all	A little	Significantly	Absolutely	Don't know

10. How do you classify the coordination mechanisms established for the elections?

Bad	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

11. How do you classify PACE-PNUD-Basket fund support to the national bodies on the following areas?

11 a. Civic education

Bad	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

11 b. Media strengthening

Bad	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

11c. CNE e GETAP's capacity building

Bad	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

12. How do you classify the PACE-PNUD-Basket fund support in the following areas (please classify each one separately):

12a. Armed forces?

13b. Police?

13c. Women?

13d. Youth?

Bad

Bad

Bad

Bad

Below average

Below average

Below average

Below average

Average

Average

Average

Average

Very good

Very good

Very good

Very good

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Excellent

Don't know

Don't know

Don't know

Don't know

13. How do you classify the PACE-PNUD-Basket fund support to the international and national observation and monitorization efforts?

Bad	Below average	Average	Very good	Excellent

Annex 8

Informant Survey – Pace II Evaluation

We would be grateful if you could fill in these questions as comprehensively as possible, relating your answers to your own personal experience in the PACE II activities and working towards the goals of your own particular component under the election support project. Please rest assured that individual contractors will not be named in the report. Should you have any queries related to the confidentiality of this survey, please do not hesitate to contact us.

1. To what extent did UNDP Pace II support contribute to the legitimacy and transparency of the 2012-2014 governance process?
 2.
 - Not at all
 - Somewhat
 - Significantly
 - Absolutely
 - I don't know
 3. How would you rate UNDP internal coordination, including that of PACE II and other UN agencies which supported the electoral process?
 4.
 - Poor
 - Below average
 - Average
 - Very good
 - Excellent
 - I don't know
3. How would you rate UNDP/PACE II coordination with external partners?
 - Poor
 - Below average
 - Average
 - Very good
 - Excellent
 - I don't know
4. To what extent did other international partner support contribute to the legitimacy and transparency of the electoral process?
 - Not at all
 - Somewhat
 - Significantly
 - Absolutely
 - I don't know
5. To what extent did integrated UNDP-PACE II structure account for improvements in electoral performance compared to the previous election?
 - Not at all

- Somewhat
- Significantly
- Absolutely
- I don't know

6. Integrated UNDP-PACE II structure is a good model to use in future elections supported by UN agencies.

- I agree
- I disagree
- Maybe, it depends on the context
- I don't know

7. How would you rate the performance of PACE II?

- Poor
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

8. UN Basket fund was a useful funding tool to coordinate multiple (although not all) donor support?

- I agree
- I disagree
- I don't know

9. UN Basket fund accounted for a cost-efficient electoral support process -- money was spent more efficiently as a result of the funds being pooled together.

- I agree
- I disagree
- I don't know

10. How would you rate the national capacity to conduct a future electoral event without international support (assuming that the new electoral bodies would consist of some of the same people)?

- Poor/Non-existent
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

11. To what extent did PACE II implement (rather than advise on) tasks for CNE, GTAPE and others:

- Not at all -- CNE, GTAPE and others implemented tasks without advice

- Somewhat -- PACE II actually implemented some of the tasks for SSRC/B
- Significantly -- PACE II implemented many of the key tasks CNE, GTAPE and others
- Absolutely – PACE II conducted all of the key tasks for CNE, GTAPE and others
- I don't know

12. How would you rate the UNDP coordinating mechanisms established for the electoral process?

- Poor
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

13. How would you rate PACE II support to national bodies in the following areas:

13 a. Civic and voter education

- Poor
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

13 b. Strengthening of media

- Poor
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

13c. Capacity development of CNE, GTAPE and others

- Poor
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

14. How would you rate PACE II support to the following areas (please rate each separately):

14a. Voter registration?

- Poor
- Below average

14b. Civic education

- Poor
- Below average

14c. Women?

- Poor
- Below average

14d. Youth?

- Poor
- Below average

- | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <input type="radio"/> Average | Average | Average | Average |
| <input type="radio"/> Very good | Very good | Very good | Very good |
| <input type="radio"/> Excellent | Excellent | Excellent | Excellent |
| <input type="radio"/> I don't know | I don't know | I don't know | I don't know |

15. How would you rate the observation missions' support to the domestic observation efforts?

- Poor
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

16. How would you rate PACE II's preparedness for the 2012 coup d'etat?

- Poor
- Below average
- Average
- Very good
- Excellent
- I don't know

17. Do you feel that the work plan and activities planned for reflected the needs identified in the reports and requests emanating from the analysis of the previous elections?

18. Do you think gender was sufficiently mainstreamed? If yes, can you explain how, and if no, how could have gender been mainstreamed more?

19. Which of the planned activities were completed/partially or not completed?

20. Were there any unplanned activities? Please specify.

21. Which actual activities contributed most to the achievement of planned results? Were there any unplanned results? Please specify.

22. Would you conclude that the activities under your component yielded expected outputs and contributed to the expected outcomes?

23. In what ways do you feel your component contributed to improving and sustaining the capacity of the beneficiaries you were working with? Please provide examples.

24. Were the TA interventions timely, adequate and appropriate at various levels? How would you assess the level of knowledge transfer and absorptive capacity of stakeholder institutions?

25. To what extent did the activities of your component benefit the intended target groups? How was this determined?

26. Was there value-for-money in the investments made by the project in fulfillment of its goals? For example, equipment acquired: to what extent was the equipment utilized during the elections?; could the equipment be used for future 2-3 elections (possibly with basic updates), training conducted, Capacity Building, TA Experts and HR?

27. Quality of Monitoring: Was there monitoring at all levels; was it appropriate? How would you assess this process?
28. What was the frequency of reporting; was results-based reporting applied at all levels?
29. Were financial resources adequate? If not, how was unavailability of adequate financial resources managed?
30. Was the Project implementation characterized by a bottom-up or top-down approach? What are some of the benefits of the selected approach?
31. Was the cost of project implementation justified? Please specify the levels of financial inputs to the project by donors.
32. What best practice approaches were applied? What was effective and what was not?
33. Appropriate Indicators: Were indicators at the activity level and results level of the project adequate? What was the basis for the identified indicators? Were they adequate/inadequate/over-ambitious?
34. Was the project a success: What has contributed to achieving the objectives and what has not?
35. With regards to the capacity built, can the beneficiaries use the knowledge gained in the future? Please give examples of how and why.
36. What type of feedback did you personally get from the beneficiaries with regards to the challenges and successes of your work?
37. Do you consider the design of the activities to have achieved the best result possible? Could they have been differently designed, or were they too ambitious?
38. Did the project components complement each other, or do you feel that the project was designed to target each component individually? Do you think the design was adequate, would you have liked to have been more linked to other components, or did you feel that your component should have been more autonomous?
39. Do you feel that the design of the project and the activities carried out reflected enough national ownership and enabled and empowered the beneficiaries to a sufficient degree? Please give examples.
40. Could you please highlight three successes of your particular component?
41. Could you please identify three challenges which you encountered during the execution of your component?
42. Can you highlight any best practices that could be adapted to any future similar projects? Lessons learned?

Annex 9

**DRAFT D'EVALUATION FINALE DU PROJET D'APPUI AU
CYCLE ELECTORAL 2012-2014 (PACE II)
GUINÉE-BISSAU**

Bissau
31ST AUGUST 2015

ANA BARRADAS – international consultant



**LA MISSION D'EVALUATION
 SOULIGNE QUE GUINÉE-BISSAU
 EST UN PAYS PETIT ET POURTANT
 TRÈS COMPLEXE ET UN VRAI DÉFI
 POUR CEUX QUI CONTRIBUENT
 POUR DES RÉSULTATS
 DÉMOCRATIQUES.**


**D'OÙ LES DIFFICULTÉS
 D'IMPLEMENTATION D'UN
 PROGRAMME COMME PACE II**



Le contexte social et humain s'est dégradé ces dernières années, et notamment depuis le coup d'Etat de 2012, en raison d'un manque généralisé de ressources de l'Etat qui a aggravé la difficulté d'accès à des services de santé et d'éducation. L'impact est visible par le fait que le pays stagne dans le dernier décile de l'indice de développement humain depuis plus de 10 ans (176ème rang sur 186 pays en 2013). En 2010, plus de 70% de la population vivait avec moins de \$2 par jour, et 30% avec moins de \$1. En 2013, ces chiffres sont estimés à la hausse, avec le taux de pauvreté absolue à plus de 40% de la population.

Aire	36.125 km²
Population	1449230 (Source: Censo 2009)
Densité Populationnel	40 personnes par kilomètre carré
Produit interne brut en termes nominaux (2009) ²⁴	826 millions US \$
Produit interne brut par habitant	513 US \$ (162) Source: BAD (Banque Africaine de Développement)

INDICATEURS



Le PACE II révisé

Objectifs	En vue à	Résultats
L'appui aux structures de gestion des processus électoraux et aux acteurs de la société civile	l'enregistrement des électeurs et l'organisation efficace, transparente et libre des élections générales de 2014 en ligne avec le cadre légal en vigueur.	100% positifs.
L'appui aux opérations électorales (y compris d'enregistrement des électeurs)	L'organisation efficace, transparente et libre des élections générales en 2013.	Les élections ont été interrompues par le coup d'état militaire. Elections générales réalisées en 2014.
Un programme d'éducation civique de longue durée	Augmenter la participation des citoyens dans les processus électoraux et contribuer aux initiatives en cours pour la réconciliation nationale dans le cadre de la gouvernance démocratique et réforme du secteur de sécurité et défense.	Le programme n'a pas été mis en marche.
Le renforcement institutionnel et développement des capacités de la CNE et autres acteurs électoraux.	Le transfert des capacités et échanges d'expérience sud-sud, l'appropriation nationale des méthodologies/instruments de gestion électorale et la rationalisation des coûts des opérations électorales.	Atteint seulement en part.



Objectifs de l'évaluation

Analyser

les points forts et les faiblesses de l'exécution du PACE II

- l'adéquation entre les objectifs et les résultats escomptés
- la pertinence des objectifs et des résultats attendus par rapport au contexte et aux besoins du pays

Évaluer

la qualité des résultats atteints et la visibilité du projet

- la durabilité des résultats escomptés
- les transferts de compétences, renforcement institutionnel, prise en charge des coûts récurrents, etc.

Formuler

des recommandations et perspectives aux fins d'améliorer les expériences futures

- des réponses aux questions d'évaluation: la pertinence, l'efficacité, l'efficience, la durabilité et l'impact.

Table 1: Status des Résultats Prétendus – Composante 1
Appui aux opérations des élections présidentielles anticipées pour mars 2012

	Résultats Prétendus	Status des Résultats
1	Appui financier aux opérations de remise de cartes d'électeurs (2 ^{ème} voie)	Atteint
2	Appui à la CNE aux opérations des élections présidentielles anticipées de 2012 :	Atteint
3	Le plan élaboré avec l'appui de l'expert en éducation civique et formation électorale et approuvé par le département de formation et éducation civique de la CNE n'a pas été mis en œuvre par décision du secrétariat de la CNE, contre l'avis technique du département d'éducation civique et formation. La formation des membres des bureaux de vote a été réalisée par voie d'un programme plus limité.	Réduit
4	L'appui au contentieux électoral pour le 2 ^{ème} tour en vue de l'annonce des résultats électoraux définitifs n'a pas pu se réaliser à cause du coup militaire.	Réduit

Table 2: Status des Résultats Prétendus – Composante 2
Appui aux opérations d'enregistrement des électeurs dans le cadre des élections générales prévues pour le dernier trimestre de 2013

Résultats Prétendus	Status des Résultats
Cette composante a été révisée car finalement et après des délais successifs, l'enregistrement électoral a été conduit par le GTAPE avec l'appui technique et financier d'une équipe d'experts de Timor-Leste.	Réduit

Table 3: Status des Résultats Prétendus – Composante 3
Appui aux opérations des élections générales de 2014

Résultats Prétendus	Status des Résultats
1 Direction, gestion et mise en œuvre de la supervision des opérations	Atteint
2 Formation en cascade du staff permanent de la CNE et des CREs	Atteint
3 L'acquisition des documents, matériels et équipements	Atteint
4 Le financement et appui à la mise en place de la campagne d'éducation civique et de mobilisation des électeurs	Atteint
5 La formation en cascade des membres des bureaux de vote	Atteint
L'appui technique et financier à la mise en œuvre des opérations électorales, notamment la logistique électorale	Atteint
7 L'appui technique et financier pour le décompte et publication des résultats électoraux.	Atteint

Table 4: Status des Résultats Prétendus – Composante 4

Programme d'Education Civique et participation politique dans un cadre de dialogue politique et réconciliation nationale

	Résultats Prétendus	Status des Résultats
1	Appui aux opérations pré-électorales et électorales à court terme	Atteint
2	Développement des capacités nationales à moyen et long terme	Réduit
3	Former et transférer le savoir-faire et compétences de tous les experts internationaux aux partenaires nationaux en appui et sous la coordination du PACE II	Réduit


Table 5: Résultats Prétendus – Composante 5

Programme de renforcement institutionnel et de développement durable des capacités des structures de gestion des processus électoraux, notamment la CNE et le GTAPE


	Résultats Prétendus	Status des Résultats
1	Appuyer la formation des dirigeants, des cadres supérieurs et staff de la CNE (et ses démembrements) et du GTAPE (et ses structures locales principales) dans les domaines de l'administration et assistance électorale en générale	Atteint
2	Assurer l'accréditation des formateurs de formateurs BRIDGE	Atteint
3	Mener une étude sur la réorganisation interne et fonctionnement des structures de la CNE et du GTAPE	Réduit
4	Appuyer la réhabilitation, la modernisation et mise à niveau de l'infrastructure physique et technologique de la CNE et du GTAPE, e particulier d'un centre multifonctionnel et de formation de la CNE et GTAPE.	Atteint
5	Appuyer le GTAPE à approfondir l'analyse des besoins et conditions préalables au upgrade du système d'enregistrement électoral	Atteint
6	Appuyer la CNE et le GTAPE à créer un cadre de discussion et échanges d'expériences en vue de l'organisation des élections locales et de la mise en œuvre d'un programme de décentralisation axée sur les OMD et le développement humain.	Réduit

Critères d'évaluation et Résultats

Critères d'évaluation	Composante 1	Composante 2	Composante 3	Composante 4	Composante 5
Efficience	Appui financier aux opérations de remise de cartes d'électeurs	Taux d'exécution très faible	Taux d'exécution optimal	Appui aux opérations pré-électorales et électorales à court terme Assurer	Appuyer la formation des dirigeants, des cadres supérieurs et staff de la CNE et du GTAPE Assurer l'accréditation des formateurs de formateurs BRIDGE
	Appui aux opérations électorales (1 ^{er} tour)		Direction, gestion et mise en œuvre de la supervision des opérations	Développement des capacités nationales à moyen terme	Appuyer le GTAPE à approfondir l'analyse des besoins et conditions préalables au upgrade du système d'enregistrement
	Plan éducation civique		Formation en cascade Mise en place de la campagne d'éducation civique	Former et transférer le savoir-faire et compétences des experts internationaux aux partenaires nationaux à long terme	Mener une étude sur la réorganisation interne et fonctionnement des structures de la CNE et du GTAPE
	Appui au contentieux électoral		Acquisition des documents, matériels et équipements		Appuyer la CNE et le GTAPE à créer un cadre de discussion et échanges d'expériences pour l'organisation des élections locales
Pertinence		Arrangements se sont révélés inadéquats par rapport aux enjeux	Objectifs et résultats pertinents	Objectifs, interventions et résultats à court terme clairs et réalistes, résultats attendus à long terme ratés	
Efficacité		Appui de PACE II est devenu dispensable	Réalisation des objectifs du projet. Structures de coordination mises en place ont fonctionné Réalisation des objectifs immédiats. Absence d'un plan stratégique cohérent		
Durabilité		Facilitation d'	Insuffisante appropriation nationale et	Taux	



Résultats



Recommandations

- **Recommandations d'ordre général**

1^o Plus de formation et appropriation pour les acteurs nationaux.

2^o Rationalisation et réduction des acteurs institutionnels pour coordination et articulation entre les divers acteurs.

3^o Combattre les mauvaises pratiques (genre, médias et manque d'information).

4^o Baisser le coût des élections : le coût par électeur a été de US\$17, une des moyennes les plus élevées au monde et bien au-dessus de la moyenne africaine.

5^o Les programmes du PNUD devraient avoir des conditionnalités pour les bénéficiaires.

Recommandations d'ordre spécifique

- Un projet pour la formation démocratique de tous les acteurs du processus électoral : le Centre de Formation pour la Démocratie.
- Étude sur CNE / GTAPE / DataBase / Ministério das Finanças / INE / pour l'harmonisation et l'éventuelle fusion de toutes les bases de données.
- Étude avec le milieu universitaire, observateurs/moniteurs et les organisations judiciaires, les OSC et les partis politiques sur les besoins d'amélioration du cadre juridique.
- Combattre les mauvaises pratiques :
 - a) peu ou aucun souci avec la question du genre et de l'égalité. Les quotas
 - b) L'appui aux besoins des médias doit être considéré pour éviter des pratiques peu démocratiques.
 - c) Des conditionnalités obligeant les bénéficiaires à adopter une attitude plus ouverte et respectueuse des droits des électeurs. Correction urgente des listes électorales.
- Plus de formation parmi les membres de la police et l'armée à tous les rangs.

• Il est douteux que les changements positifs intervenus continuent à l'avenir en raison de la substitution périodique des secrétaires de la CNE. Une autre solution devrait être trouvée.

• La complémentarité, la collaboration et la synergie entre les partenaires au développement devront être renforcées pour qu'elles puissent devenir durables. La situation présente ne favorise pas l'appropriation et la soutenabilité nécessaires.

• Il est convenient d'investir plus de travail de formation parmi les membres de la police et l'armée.

• Considérer le prochain appui au GTAPE sous condition de correction et « nettoyage » des listes et base de données.

• Assistance technique à une actualisation limitée à ceux qui ont atteint 18 ans après la période d'inaltérabilité des listes électorales.

Annex 10

FIVE-YEAR PROGRAMME
FOR THE INSTALLATION OF A LEARNING FACILITY
OR
CENTRO DE FORMAÇÃO PARA A DEMOCRACIA

2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Programme set-up, complete 2016-2020 work plan, adjusted to needs	Enlargement and implementation of the work plan Based on the 2016 experience, with a curriculum for studies on democratic governance		Official inauguration of the learning/training/management institution, which would absorb all the tasks and on-going activities of the Documentation Center	All elections multimedia activities and institutional memory fund under the management of NEC and Electoral Institute
Installation of a Documentation Center				Mobile training teams to serve community-based projects (communitary radios, women or youth groups, schools, etc.)
International technical assistant in charge of the assistance to the installation (for one year, renewable)				Public utility TV publicity spots for civic awareness, TV debates on electoral and civil society themes, education programs
Training of Trainers for Civic Education Agents, Electoral Agents, Political Parties, CSOs, academia, observer and monitoring organizations, Women, Youth	Donors' mid-term evaluation mission		Lessons learned exercise	Sponsored international summer course with renowned specialists organizing workshops and seminars on democratic governance
				National in-house programme dedicated to specific needs of community-base NGOs and CSOs
				Annual sponsored award for best democratic practices

			Donors' evaluation mission
--	--	--	----------------------------

ACTIVITIES SUMMARY

Support and network with political parties, CSOs, electoral staff or observers

Focal areas

Gender issues, women empowerment, youth participation, electoral agents training

Legal issues

Electoral reform, Media legal framework, Electoral tribunals reform and support

Learning/training/management institution

Prepare conditions for its future sustainability (donors support, donations, programme sponsors).

Curricula adapted to local and national needs and covering training for all literacy levels and all types of activists,
from the grass-roots to the top

Civic and voters education

Stakeholders conferences, seminars, workshops, train-the-trainers

High visibility campaigns when necessary (against political violence, fraud and malpractices,

for mandate protections, transparency

and electoral staff and bodies' accountability)

Annual public reports by Media monitoring group

Electoral Observatory

Annual award for best democratic practices

IDEAS

Public tender and specific persons to encourage as candidates:

Paulina Mendes

Eugénia Jombe

Leopoldo Amado

Raul Fernandes

(preference to a female candidate in similar profiles)

The name is not important for the moment, but there are suggestions :

Centro de Formação Cheik Ante Diop
Centro de Formação Fafali Kudawo

Sponsors potentiels:

Jimmy Carter Foundation
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation
Melanie and Bill Gates Foundation
UNESCO.

Copyright Ana Barradas

Annex 11

CALENDAR

Activity	August 7 to 9	August 10-16	August 17-23	August 24-31	Sept 1-2	Sept. 2-4
Identifying and engaging the desk review/						
Desk-review, interviews, surveys.						
Interviews / Surveys, visit to CREs						
Interviews with Key Informants						
Interviews with Key Informants						
Design of lessons learning exercise, Draft final report,						
De-briefing with UNDP , Final Report						

